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Abstract
Future electricity grids will enable greater and more sophisticated demand side
participation, which refers to the inclusion of mechanisms that enable dynamic
modification of electricity demand into the operations of the electricity market,
known as Demand Response (DR). The underlying information-flow infrastructures
provided by the emerging smart grid enhance the interactions between customers
and the market, by which DR will improve electricity grids in several aspects,
e.g., by reducing peak demand and reducing need for expensive peaker plants, or
by enabling demand to follow supply such as those from volatile renewable re-
sources, etc. Many types of appliances provide flexibilities in power usage which
can be viewed as demand response resources, and how to exploit such flexibilities
to achieve the benefits offered by DR is a central challenge. In this dissertation, we
design algorithms and architectures to bridge the gap between scheduling appli-
ances and the benefits that DR can bring to electricity grid by utilizing the smart
grid’s underlying information infrastructure.
First, we focus on demand response within the consumer premise, where an
energy management controller (EMC) schedules appliance operation on behalf of
customers to save energy cost. We propose an optimization-based control scheme
for the EMC in the building that integrates both the operational flexible appliances
such as clothes washer/dryer, dish washer and plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs),
but also the thermostatically controlled appliances such as HVAC (heating, venti-
lation, and air conditioning) systems together with the thermal mass of the build-
ing. Model predictive control is employed to account for uncertainty in electricity
prices and weather information. Under time-varying pricing, scheduling appliances
smartly using our scheme can incur notable energy cost saving for customers. As
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an alternative, we also propose a communication-based control approach which is
a joint appliance access and scheduling scheme in which the control algorithms
are embedded into the communication protocols used by appliances. The control
scheme is based on a threshold maximum power consumption set by the EMC; and
we discuss how this threshold can be chosen so that it integrates the availability
of local distributed renewable energy resources.
Then we investigate demand response in the retail market level which involves
interactions between customers and utilities. Pricing-based control and direct load
control (DLC) are two types of approaches that are used or envisioned for this
level. To address pricing based control methods, we propose real-time pricing
(RTP) signals that can be designed to work with customer premise EMCs. The
interaction between these EMCs and the pricing-setting utilities is modeled as a
Stackelberg game. We demonstrate that our proposed RTP scheme reduces peak
load and alleviates rebound peaks that are the typical shortcomings in existing
pricing approaches. To address DLC methods, we propose a distributed DLC
scheme based on a two-layer communication network infrastructure for large-scale,
aggregate DR implementations. In the proposed scheme, average consensus algo-
rithms are employed to distributively allocate control tasks amongst EMCs so that
local appliance scheduling within each home will eventually achieve the aggregated
control task, i.e., to alleviate mismatch between electricity supply and demand.
Finally, we study how demand response affects the wholesale electricity mar-
ket. As is conventional when studying interactions between electricity generators,
we employ the Cournot game model to analyze how DR aggregators may impact
wholesale energy markets. To do so, we assume that DR aggregators employ a com-
putationally efficient, centralized scheduling mechanism to manage deferrable load
over a large aggregate set of consumers. The load reduction from deferrable load
2
can be seen as ‘generation’ in terms of balancing the market and is compensated
as such under current regulatory mandates. Thus, the DR aggregator competes
with other generators in a Cournot-Nash manner to make a profit in the wholesale
market; and electricity prices are consequently reduced. We provide equilibrium
analysis of the wholesale market that includes DR aggregators and demonstrate
that under certain conditions the equilibrium exists and is unique.
3
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Demand response
U.S. electricity grids face increasing pressure to match supply and demand. This
pressure comes from two sources: On the one hand, electricity demand is increas-
ing in quantity and changing in quality. For example, the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) estimates that overall electricity demand will increase 30%
from 3.9 trillion kWh in 2009 to 5.0 trillion kWh in 2035 [1]. A portion of this
increase will come from wide adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) whose demand
profile is significantly different from current loads. On the other hand, driven by
increasing prices for fossil fuels and concerns about greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions, renewable energy resources are rapidly being introduced into the existing
electricity supply portfolio. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
estimates that wind power will meet 20% of the U.S. electricity demand by 2030,
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which means that the U.S. wind power capacity may reach more than 300 gigawatts
(GW) [2]. With emerging smart grid technologies, a key solution for the power
grids to alleviate the stresses of increasing demand and intermittent renewable
generation is to encourage demand response (DR) as demand side participation in
the electricity market [3]. According to the DOE, DR is defined as
“Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal consumption
patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to incentive
payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high wholesale market
prices or when system reliability is jeopardized.”
The capabilities of “changes in electric usage” in the definition above are the
resources available for demand response. It is observed that certain types of ap-
pliances with operational flexibility may serve as candidate resources for DR. For
example, some appliances offer flexibility in the operation time (e.g., dish washer
or clothes washer/dryer) so that their start time can be delayed under the con-
straint of a hard deadline. The plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) is another important
emerging load type that offers flexibility in the power consumed in charging PEV
batteries. This type of load is a great DR asset because individual PEV battery
charge can be modified (and coordinated across multiple PEV batteries) as long as
its total energy requirement is fulfilled by a given deadline. Thus, DR schemes that
exploit loads with flexible operation time and power draw can shift electricity usage
in time and benefit both consumers and the grid [4]. From the grid’s perspective,
shifting some load away from peak periods 1) lowers the cost of employing less effi-
cient generation during peak demand; 2) alleviates transmission congestion; and 3)
helps maintain grid stability during these critical peak hours. From the customer’s
perspective, shifting load to off-peak periods results in reduced electricity bills and
occurrences of blackouts and brownouts.
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Due to the underlying two-way communication infrastructures enabled by the
future smart grid renovation, the interactions between customers, utilities, and the
market can be largely enhanced. A central challenge on implementing demand re-
sponse in future smart grids is how to manage demand response resources, i.e., how
to exploit the underlying information infrastructure and operational flexibilities of
loads to achieve the promised benefits of DR.
1.1.2 Three levels of DR in the smart grid
Depending on the different levels of aggregation, DR implementation and partici-
pation in the layered structure of the electricity market can be divided into three
categories as shown in Figure 1.1.
EMC 
Utilities 
Generator 
Generator 
ISO 
Utilities 
Utilities 
Generator 
Retail electricity market
Wholesale electricity market 
Power transmission 
Power distribution 
In-home scheduling 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Figure 1.1: Three levels of DR implementation in electricity market
• Consumer premise level: The energy management controller (EMC) sched-
ules operation of appliances within home to save money or fulfill the control
task on behalf of customers;
• Retail market level: With appliance scheduling capabilities, the EMCs inter-
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act with utilities in the retail electricity market;
• Wholesale market level: Large-scale aggregation of DR resources can partic-
ipate in and affect the wholesale electricity market.
In this dissertation, we propose innovative algorithms and architectures for
scheduling appliances as demand response in these three levels, and evaluate the
benefits accordingly. The main contribution of our work is to bridge the gap
between the scheduling of appliances and the benefits that demand response can
bring to the grids utilizing underlying information infrastructure, and to guide the
implementation of residential demand response scheme in future smart grids.
(1) DR in consumer premise level
The demand response implemented in this level usually aims at minimizing the en-
ergy (electricity) cost by smartly scheduling appliances within a home. Besides the
operational flexibilities provided by some appliances such as clothes washer/dryer,
dish washer, thermal comfort flexibilities of customers provide additional freedom
in scheduling thermostatically controlled appliances like HVAC (heating, venti-
lation and air conditioning) systems. In addition, several utilities, e.g., Ameren
Illinois [5] and ComEd [6], already provide time-varying electricity tariffs to sub-
scribed customers. Such customers can utilize their load flexibilities to save on
electricity bills. However, current residential load control activities are mainly op-
erated manually, which poses great challenges to customers in optimally scheduling
the operations of their appliances. Customers may not have time to make such
scheduling decisions and if prices vary fast and frequently, scheduling may be too
complex. Hence, an automated energy management controller (EMC) is necessary
to optimize the appliances’ operation on behalf of customers.
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In this dissertation, we design appliance scheduling schemes for the EMC to
fully exploit the various degrees of flexibilities required by different appliances to
save energy cost on behalf of customers. One approach is to formulate optimization
problems of appliance scheduling in response to time-varying pricing, where opera-
tional and thermal flexibilities are integrated as a viable tool of changing the power
usage profile to save money. An alternative approach is to combine the control and
the underlying communication together, i.e., design a communication-based con-
trol scheme where the load control problem is embedded into the communication
protocol.
(2) DR in retail market level
The interactions between customers and utilities are usually involved when DR is
implemented in the retail market level. By these interactions, utilities can make
customers change their power usage profile, either directly or indirectly, to reduce
peak demand and alleviate the mismatch between supply and demand. In general,
there are two approaches for DR in the retail market, as shown in Figure 1.2:
Smart buildingInteraction with utilities/aggregator  
SmartControl signal
DirectLoadControl(DLC)Approach
WAN
EMC
l
appliances
Distributed

Utilities
/aggregator
El t i hi l
E ectricityprice
Powerusagedecision
storage
Distributed
generation
(renewable)S t P i i b d A h ec r cve c emar  r c ngͲ ase  pproac
Figure 1.2: Two types of approaches for DR in retail market
a. Direct load control (DLC) approaches: Current DLC programs provided by
utilities are usually contract-based, i.e., by signing up for the contract, customers
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give utilities the option to remotely shut down appliances during high-demand
periods or power supply emergency, and receive credit on electricity bills for this
participation. Examples of these DLC programs include Contracted Direct Load
Control by Wisconsin Public Service [7] and Distribution Load Relief Program by
conEdison [8].
Several limitations exist for these types of DLC programs. Firstly, they are only
for emergency cases so that they do not fully exploit the operational flexibilities
of appliances which have potential for balancing supply and demand. Secondly, in
scenarios with a large number of customers (and loads) participating, complexities
of computation and communication are huge for the central controller. Another
limit is due to customers’ privacy concerns since their power usage is exposed as
each individual appliance is remotely controlled by the central controller.
In this dissertation, we propose a distributed direct load control scheme which
overcomes the drawbacks of the current DLC programs listed above. The schedul-
ing of appliances is conducted within each home by the EMC, and all EMCs are
coordinated by local communications so that the control task can be allocated in
a distributed way.
b. Smart pricing-based approaches: Utilities can also choose to control appli-
ances indirectly by sending price signals. Specifically, the variation of wholesale
electricity prices is brought to the retail electricity prices and affects customers’
electricity bills. With time-varying electricity prices, customers may be induced
to make smart energy decisions, e.g., shifting some power usage during high-price
periods to low-price periods which will save customers money and reduce overall
burden on the grid during peak demand periods. Examples of implementation of
these types of approaches include Ameren Illinois [5], and ComEd [6].
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Although there are time-varying pricing schemes currently, none of them are
fully dynamic. This means that there exists potential for ‘rebound peak demand’
[9], which are instances in which a significant number of customers shift their loads
to low-price periods and cause a new peak. In some cases, this rebound peak can be
far more problematic (i.e., far more of a mismatch to the available power supply)
than the original high-price peak. A possible solution is to introduce real-time
pricing (RTP) which reflects the more dynamical relationship between supply and
demand in the market. In this dissertation, we propose an innovative RTP scheme
which combines residential flexible appliance scheduling. The interaction between
the utilities and customers is modeled as a Stackelberg game and the algorithms
can be implemented via the underlying two-way communication network.
(3) DR in wholesale market level
Depending on the Independent System Operator’s (ISO’s) market design, DR may
provide energy, reserve ancillary service (A/S), or capacity in the wholesale electric-
ity market [10]. Currently, several trials of DR programs have been implemented
by some ISOs in the U.S., e.g. New York ISO (NYISO) [11], PJM [12] and ISO
New England (ISO-NE) [13]. At the same time, stimulus of DR in the wholesale
electricity market is also provided by regulatory institutions like Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC). For example, FERC Order No.719 [14] and No.
745 [15] specify how ISOs can permit Demand Response Providers (DRPs) to bid
DR on behalf of retail customers directly into the ISO’s organized markets, and get
compensated for the service they provide at the locational marginal price (LMP).
These efforts help integrate DR resources into the wholesale electricity market to
cope with future supply-demand matching challenges.
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When DR resources participate in the wholesale electricity market, aggregation
is usually needed. In such cases, an important question for future DR systems is
how will a DR aggregator manage operational flexibilities of loads across a large
number of customers. The approaches we propose for DR in the retail market, i.e.,
for direct load control, could be one way to do this. In this dissertation, we build
on an alternate computationally efficient architecture of managing deferrable loads
as a market asset and employ Cournot game model to analyze the effects of DR
aggregators’ participation in the wholesale market.
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation
As previously mentioned, this dissertation mainly focuses on three levels of de-
mand response in the grid: consumer-premise level DR where the EMC schedules
appliances to save money on behalf of customer; retail market level DR where
EMCs interact with the utilities to reduce peak demand or match the supply and
demand; wholesale market level DR where the aggregators apply DR resources
in the wholesale electricity market and influence the market, e.g., the electricity
prices. A brief outline of this dissertation is presented as follows.
In Chapter 2, we apply model predictive control (MPC) method to appliance
scheduling within a building under a time-varying pricing scenario. Specifically, the
building thermal mass is integrated by modeling the building’s thermal dynamics
as linear difference equality constraints in its optimization. Thus, electricity cost
can be saved when the scheduler utilizes the thermal mass (serving as heat storage)
in conjunction with time-varying prices and weather information when scheduling
loads. In addition, scheduling of non-thermal flexible appliances is modeled as a
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mixed-integer linear program and both inter-appliance and intra-appliance depen-
dencies are incorporated when scheduling in the face of time-varying prices. With
the proposed scheme, customers are shown to have notably reduced electricity
costs.
In Chapter 3, we focus on how a consumer premise communication network
(e.g., a home-area network) can be designed to permit load scheduling amongst
flexible and controllable loads. Our proposed scheme alleviates the EMC of the
communication and computation complexities of directly scheduling each individ-
ual load in the consumer premise. The functionalities of the EMC are reduced in
our model to calculating a threshold maximum power consumption for the home.
We cast the calculation of this time-varying threshold power as an optimization
problem which accounts for price variation and uncertainty due to local wind gener-
ation. Our proposed joint access and scheduling protocol describes how appliances
access a common control channel so that this total maximum demand target is
not exceeded for each time slot. Unlike existing local area network (LAN) me-
dia access protocols (e.g., Wi-Fi, G.hn, Zigbee), which could be used for one of
several applications, our proposed scheme specifically addresses the load control
problem. For in-home scenarios, relatively short control messages are occasion-
ally exchanged; thus the approach can be easily implemented on higher data-rate
LANs. To provide analytical foundations, we study the evolution of the protocol
as a two-dimensional Markov chain and quantify the average delay experienced by
individual appliances.
In Chapter 4, we move our focus on how the real-time pricing (RTP) can
make a connection between scheduling appliances and the benefits of this demand
response, e.g., peak load reduction. A Stackelberg game model is formulated to
analyze the interaction between a customer’s EMC and the serving electric utility,
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where the utility plays the leader level game and the customer plays the follower
level game. The RTPs are signals that can indirectly make customers change their
power usage profile, and as a result, the peak load as well as the mismatch between
supply and demand can be alleviated. Due to the dynamic adjusting of the pricing
introduced in our approach, the ‘rebound peak demand’ can also be alleviated.
In Chapter 5, we aim at the direct load control (DLC) as an alternative ap-
proach for demand response in the retail market level. We propose a distributed
direct load control approach based on a two-layer communication network infras-
tructure. The lower-layer network is within each building, where the energy man-
agement controller (EMC) uses wireless links to schedule operation of appliances
upon request according to a local power consumption target. The upper-layer
network links a number of EMCs in a region whose aggregated demand is served
by a load aggregator. The load aggregator wants the actual (day-of) aggregated
demand over this region to match a desired aggregated demand profile (i.e., day-
ahead planned supply). Our approach utilizes the average consensus algorithm to
distribute portions of the desired aggregated demand to each EMC in a decen-
tralized fashion. The allocated portion corresponds to each building’s local power
consumption target which its EMC then uses to schedule the in-building appli-
ances. The result will be an aggregated demand over this region that more closely
reaches the desired demand.
In Chapter 6, we investigate the impact of demand response at the wholesale
market level. A Cournot game model is proposed to analyze the market effects with
participation of DR aggregators, which manage aggregated deferrable load using
a computationally efficient architecture. According to the FERC rules, the load
reduction of the DR aggregator from deferrable loads can be viewed as ‘generation’
in terms of balancing the market. Thus the DR aggregator competes with other
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traditional generators in a Cournot-Nash manner to make a profit in the market,
and market prices are reduced as a consequence. With the Cournot game model,
we provide equilibrium analysis of the wholesale market that includes the DR
aggregators. We show that under certain conditions, the market equilibrium exists
and is unique.
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Chapter 2
Residential Appliance Scheduling
in Buildings: An Optimization
Approach
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on demand response in residential buildings, and formu-
late optimizations for scheduling of several types of appliances. Our approach takes
advantage of future two-way communication infrastructure underlying the emerg-
ing smart grid, and utilizes time-varying prices to save money for customers. The
proposed optimization-based control algorithms can be integrated into a building
energy management controller (BEMC) that schedules appliances on behalf of the
customer automatically. The residential appliances for scheduling can be divided
into non-thermal appliances with flexible operation (e.g. clothes washer/dryer, dish
washer, plug-in electric vehicle (PEV)), and thermostatically controlled appliances
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in which customers’ comfort ranges provide a degree of operational flexibility.
For non-thermal flexible appliances scheduling, we formulate a mixed-integer
linear programming (MIP) problem that captures the key features of appliance
operations, and also the inter-appliance and intra-appliance dependences to exploit
finer granularity when faced with time-varying prices. The MIP problems can be
solved efficiently within the building scale, and can be easily embedded into the
BEMC.
For thermostatically controlled appliances scheduling, our approach integrates
the thermal mass of the building in a linear programming (LP) problem. Specifi-
cally, a simplified 14-node thermal dynamics model is proposed as linear difference
equality constraints in the LP, such that the thermal mass of the building can rep-
resent heat storage and be effectively utilized to save money for customers. Model
predictive control (MPC) is applied in the optimization to incorporate updated
external information such as prices and weather information.
There are several studies about residential appliance scheduling. Certain types
of delay flexible appliance scheduling optimization is formulated in [9] and [16]. The
ON/OFF operations of individual appliances are modeled as independent Markov
chains in [17]. However, other operation constraints like operational dependencies
and minimum operation duration are omitted in these papers. For thermal ap-
pliances scheduling, Lu et al. presented a cost minimization problem for electric
water heater (EWH) scheduling considering the thermal dynamics of water heating
systems and customers’ preferences [18]. The thermal dynamics of heating, venti-
lation, and air conditioning (HVAC) is considered in [19]. But the thermal system
only incorporated the heat transfer between the room air and the outside envi-
ronment, omitting the thermal mass storage of the building itself. An exponential
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decay building thermal model is utilized in [20], and dynamic programming is used
for thermal appliance scheduling. Instead of using an optimization formulation,
simulation tests for certain pre-cooling strategies considering the thermal mass are
conducted in [21]. An MPC method for thermal appliance scheduling considering
the thermal dynamics of the building is employed in both [22] and [23]. The ther-
mal model in [22] only considers a simple three-node case to represent the building
while the thermal model used in [23] has non-linearity issues. Besides, both papers
apply only the temperature as a thermal comfort indicator in their formulations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the
system model. Section 2.3 formulates the optimization problems for non-thermal
appliances scheduling. Section 2.4 incorporates the thermal mass of buildings
in the thermal appliances scheduling optimization problem. Section 2.5 presents
numerical simulation results and we conclude our discussion in Section 2.6.
2.2 System Model
In this paper, we consider a residential building, in which home appliances are
scheduled by the BEMC, shown in Figure 2.1. In our model, appliances in the
building can be divided into the following categories for scheduling:
• Delay flexible appliances, e.g., clothes washer/dryer, dish washer, etc.
• Delay and power consumption flexible appliances, such as a PEV battery.
• Thermal appliances, which include electric heater and A/C.
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Figure 2.1: Residential building energy management system
The detailed models of these types of appliances for the scheduling optimization will
be discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. The BEMC schedules operation of appliances
by exploiting these flexibilities. In our model, the BEMC (acting on behalf of the
customer) is a price taker so that its scheduling decision does not affect electricity
prices.
Model predictive control (MPC) refers to a class of control methods that com-
pute a sequence of decision variable adjustments over a future time horizon it-
eratively based on an underlying optimization model and forecasts of uncertain
variables. In other words, MPC is a rolling process that runs the embedded op-
timization model repeatedly with updated forecasts. MPC is now recognized as
a very powerful approach with well established theoretical foundation and proven
capability to handle a large number of control problems with uncertainty [22]. The
thermal dynamics of the building which is viewed as a process model underlying
the appliance scheduling optimization, and the prediction of time-varying prices
as well as weather can all be incorporated in the MPC method for the BEMC to
utilize the building thermal mass and time-varying pricing.
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The MPC method is employed by the BEMC in scheduling appliances, shown
in Figure 2.2. The time-line is divided into slots for scheduling, each time slot
with a duration of ∆ minutes. The MPC-based approach works as follows: At
any time slot t, the BEMC gets the current electricity price and weather data and
forecast data from t + 1 to t + N − 1. The BEMC then solves an optimization
problem to minimize the energy cost of thermal appliances (A/C or heater) over
this N -slot time horizon. The actual operation (power consumption) at time t will
follow the optimization result for that time. Then at time t+1, the BEMC obtains
updated information for the next N time slots (from t+1 to t+N) and solves this
finite horizon optimization problem again, and schedules the power consumption
for time t + 1. The time horizon moves forward by one time slot for the new
optimization. For non-thermal flexible appliances scheduling, let Rt denote the set
of requested appliances at the beginning of t (these requests happen during t − 1
slot), the BEMC optimizes the operation (ON/OFF status) or power consumptions
for the next N slots starting from t, and the actual appliances’ operation will
follow the optimization results. As this finite time horizon optimization procedure
schedules the appliances’ operation considering not only the current information
by also the forecast information, short-sightedness in scheduling can be avoided.
Detailed optimization formulations are described in the next two sections, where
τ = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 is used for the relative time index within the time horizon N .
t
 = 0; 1 : : :N x 1
{
timeline 
(Optimization time horizon) 
Rt
t+N x 1
Figure 2.2: MPC-based appliance scheduling
Note that the future information, i.e., electricity prices and weather data, within
the time horizon N need forecasting techniques, which is not focus of our approach.
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Instead, we assume that the BEMC obtains perfect forecasts, which use the real
prices and weather data in the simulations as shown in Section 2.5. Extensive
studies about electricity price forecasting can be found in [24] [25], etc.
2.3 Operation Flexible Appliance Scheduling
In this section, the optimization problem of scheduling non-thermal appliances
is formulated. We consider two categories of appliances: delay flexible appliances
(such as dishwashers, clothes washers and clothes dryers) and both delay and power
consumption flexible appliances (such as PEV batteries).
In the first category, rather than scheduling each device, the BEMC schedules
the task of a user’s power consumption event, which considers both intra-appliance
and inter-appliance dependencies. In the second category, we consider both charg-
ing and discharging modes of a PEV battery so that it can further help to save
energy cost.
2.3.1 Delay flexible appliance scheduling
In a household, the operation of delay flexible appliances usually has the follow-
ing features: 1) The power consumption operation depends on the customers’
request, i.e., customers pushing the start button of the appliance. 2) There is
interdependence in appliances’ operation, which can be either intra-appliance or
inter-appliance. Intra-appliance dependence refers to cycles of an appliance opera-
tion. For example, the clothes washer has washing, rinsing, spinning, and mainte-
nance wash cycles, where each cycle may run several times depending on the user’s
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configuration. Inter-appliance dependence refers to the interaction of different ap-
pliances. For example, a clothes dryer must operate after completion of a clothes
washer. 3) Usually, some amount of time delay between tasks is allowed, for both
intra-appliance and inter-appliance tasks.
We designed our flexible appliance scheduling algorithm according to the fea-
tures listed above. When there is a power request from the customer, the schedul-
ing algorithm will be triggered at the beginning of next nearest slot. Rather than
scheduling the appliance as a consecutive block of power consumption, the BEMC
treats each task individually; and thus, considers the intra-appliance and inter-
appliance dependencies uniformly. In this way, the delay flexibility is not only from
the delay time between the customer’s request and actual appliance powering-on,
but also from the time interval between tasks. Optimally allocating the task sched-
ule and intervals between tasks may utilize low-price periods and hedge against
high-price periods.
Let i denote the index of an event, and k denote the index of a task for a
certain event. We define a binary variable uki,τ to indicate the ON/OFF status
of an appliance with regard to task k for event i at time slot τ within the time
horizon, where uki,τ = 1 indicates the ON status. For ease of formulation, we also
define ancillary binary variables zki,τ and y
k
i,τ to represent the start-up and shut-
down actions, respectively, of task k for event i at time slot τ within the time
horizon, where zki,τ = 1 and y
k
i,τ = 1 mean the start-up and shut-down actions.
(1) Objective function: Since each event operates independently and given the
assumption that the BEMC is a price taker (i.e., the power consumption of one
event does not influence the price of electricity, and thus, it does not affect the
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decision of scheduling another event), we model the optimization for each event
individually.
The objective of scheduling is to minimize the energy cost, which is the money
paid for the power consumption of that event over the time horizon of N slots.
min
uki,τ ,y
k
i,τ ,z
k
i,τ
STi∑
k=1
N−1∑
τ=0
uki,τ · P
k
i · κτ , (2.1)
where κτ is the electricity price at time slot τ , and P
k
i is the power consumption
level of appliance i for task k. STi denotes the number of tasks in event i.
(2) Coupling constraints of individual task ON/OFF status, start-up
and shut-down indicator: (2.2)-(2.4) formulates the logic relation between the
ON/OFF status, start-up and shut-down indicators.
uki,τ − u
k
i,τ−1 = z
k
i,τ − y
k
i,τ , ∀i, k ∈ {1..STi}, τ. (2.2)
zki,τ ≤ u
k
i,τ , ∀i, k ∈ {1..STi}, τ. (2.3)
yki,τ ≤ 1− u
k
i,τ , ∀i, k ∈ {1..STi}, τ. (2.4)
uki,τ , y
k
i,τ , z
k
i,τ ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, k ∈ {1..STi}, τ. (2.5)
(3) Start-up and shut-down time constraints: We assume each task of the
event only operates once during the time horizon N , i.e., there is only one start-up
and shut-down action of each task. If one cycle of operation happens several times
during the event, these cycles are treated as different tasks sequentially. We write
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these constraints as
N−1∑
τ=0
zki,τ = 1,
N−1∑
τ=0
yki,τ = 1, ∀ i, k ∈ {1..STi}. (2.6)
(4) Operation time constraints: We assume that once a task has powered
on, the corresponding appliance remains on for T k,ONi slots with a constant power
consumption level of P ki . To map this requirement to the decision variable, we
employ the minimum-ON constraints of the unit commitment problem [26] in the
following.
τ∑
τ ′=max(0,τ−T k,ONi +1)
zki,τ ′ ≤ u
k
i,τ , ∀ τ, i, k. (2.7)
The inequality constraints in (2.7) guarantee that the operation time of task k is
greater than T k,ONi . If electricity prices are positive, from the objective function
(2.1), we see that operation time of T k,ONi always incur the lowest cost. So these
constraints actually specify that the operation time of task k is equal to T k,ONi . For
the case of negative electricity prices, the task operation time may be extended
to earn extra money. If tasks allow extra operation time, our scheme still applies;
for the tasks with strict operation time, a hard deadline can be set in the actual
scheduling.
(5) Operation dependence constraints: Without loss of generality, we as-
sume the operation order of tasks for an event to be ascending in the index, i.e.,
task k can only operate after the (k − 1)-th task completes its operation. Us-
ing start-up (zki,τ ) and shut-down (y
k
i,τ ) indicators, we formulate these operation
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dependence constraints as follows.
N−1∑
τ=0
τ · zki,τ ≥
N−1∑
τ=0
τ · yk−1i,τ , ∀ i, k = 2, 3, . . . , STi. (2.8)
where
∑N−1
τ=0 τ ·z
k
i,τ represents the duration before task k starts up and
∑N−1
τ=0 τ ·y
k−1
i,τ
represents the duration before task k − 1 shuts down. Note that τ denotes the
relevant time slot index within the time horizon (e.g., τ = 0, 1, . . . , N −1), and the
request of the event happens at beginning of the time horizon (τ = 0).
(6) Delay constraints: As shown in the dependence constraints (2.8), an inter-
val between sequential tasks may be allowed. Different tasks have different delay
interval tolerances depending on the nature of the task. For example, after the
cycle of pumping the water to fill the drum of the clothes washer, it is beneficial to
wait for a while to make full use of the cleaning effect of the detergent, but waiting
too long is harmful to the clothes. The following task delay constraints guarantee
that these task delay flexibilities will not impact the task quality.
N−1∑
τ=0
τ · zki,τ −
N−1∑
τ=0
τ · yk−1i,τ ≤ D
k
i , ∀k, (2.9)
where Dki is the delay tolerance for task k of event i.
Besides each individual task delay tolerance, the customer usually specifies an
overall event delay, i.e., once the customer pushes the start button of an appliance,
how much time he/she is willing to wait for until event completion. This total
delay constraint can be obtained by adding all delays of tasks for this event, as
shown in (2.10).
STi∑
k=2
(
N−1∑
τ=0
τ · zki,τ−
N−1∑
τ=0
τ · yk−1i,τ
)
+
N−1∑
τ=0
τ · z1i,τ ≤ Di, ∀ i, (2.10)
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where Di is the overall delay tolerance of task i.
The optimization can be formulated as the objective function in (2.1) under
constraints (2.2) – (2.10), which together form an integer linear programming (ILP)
problem.
2.3.2 PEV battery charging/discharging scheduling
The PEV battery can either act as the demand – when in the charging mode – or
the supply of electricity when in the discharging mode. The flexibility of the PEV
batteries is not only from the charging/discharging status switching, but also from
the power drawn to and from the battery. The scheduling time horizon for the
PEV battery is from its arrival to the departure while it is plugged in. The BEMC
aims to minimize the energy cost of charging during this period, while guaranteeing
the battery being charged above some level at the departure time.
To capture the two possible modes of a PEV battery, we employ a binary
variable vτ to indicate mode status at time slot τ ; specifically, vτ = 0 for charging
mode and vτ = 1 for discharging mode. Two ancillary variables scτ and sdτ are
defined to indicate start charging and start discharging actions. Let continuous
variable Bτ denote charging/discharging rate, where positive value is for charging
and negative value is for discharging. Since there is an efficiency for both charging
and discharging, we define an ancillary variable B˜τ to indicate power drawn to
(charging, positive value) or from (discharging, negative value) the PEV battery.
In the following parts we model operation constraints for battery and formulate
the battery scheduling optimization to minimize the energy cost to customers.
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(1) Coupling status constraints: The coupling constraints of battery status,
start charging and start discharging indicator, which are similar to those of the
appliances’ ON/OFF status and start-up/shut-down, can be written as
vτ − vτ−1 = sdτ − scτ , ∀τ, (2.11)
sdτ ≤ vτ , ∀τ, (2.12)
scτ ≤ (1− vτ ), ∀τ, (2.13)
vτ , scτ , sdτ ∈ {0, 1}, ∀τ. (2.14)
(2) Minimum charging/discharging time constraints: To protect the lifes-
pan of the PEV battery, the frequent charging/discharging switch should be avoided.
We employ a minimum charging/discharging time denoted by CT/DT , which in-
dicates if the battery starts charging/discharging mode, it must remain in the same
mode for at least CT/DT time slots, respectively. These constraints are related
to the battery status, the start charging and the start discharging indicators as
follows:
τ∑
τ ′=max(0,t−DT+1)
sdτ ′ ≤ vτ , ∀τ (2.15)
τ∑
τ ′=max(0,t−CT+1)
scτ ′ ≤ 1− vτ , ∀τ (2.16)
(3) Charging/discharging rate constraints: The charging and discharging
rate should be bounded by [Blc, B
u
c ] and [B
l
d, B
u
d ], respectively. Note that for dis-
charging, Bld, B
u
d ≤ 0. The charging/discharging status vτ can be used to write
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this constraint in a uniform way.
(1− vτ )B
l
c + vτB
l
d ≤ Bτ ≤ (1− vτ )B
u
c + vτB
u
d , ∀τ. (2.17)
We can see when vτ = 1 (discharging), Bτ ∈ [B
l
d, B
u
d ], and when vτ = 0 (charging),
Bτ ∈ [B
l
c, B
u
c ].
(4) State of charge (SOC) constraints: Due to an efficiency parameter for
both charging and discharging, the charging/discharging rates Bτ are not the same
as the power drawn to/from the battery B˜τ . Let ηI and ηO denote the charging
and discharging efficiency, respectively. The relation of charging/discharging rates
and power drawn to/from the battery in terms of the efficiency can be written as:
B˜τ =


ηI · Bτ , if Bτ ≥ 0,
Bτ
ηO
, if Bτ < 0,
(2.18)
where the coefficients ηI and ηO lie in (0, 1]. However, (2.18) depends on the actual
value of charging/discharging rates Bτ , which are decision variables, so they cannot
be added as constraints directly. In order to express these conditional constraints
as linear constraints, we introduce big values (MB1−MB4) as an ancillary constant,
and convert (2.18) into the following four inequalities:
B˜τ ≥ Bτ · ηI − vτ ·MB1, (2.19)
B˜τ ≥
Bτ
ηO
− (1− vτ ) ·MB2, (2.20)
B˜τ ≤ Bτ · ηI + vτ ·MB3, (2.21)
B˜τ ≤
Bτ
ηO
+ (1− vτ ) ·MB4. (2.22)
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These ancillary variables should be set as small as possible for to accelerate the
speed. According to the structures of these inequalities, we can set MB1 = −
Bu
d
ηO
,
MB2 =
Buc
ηO
, and MB3 = MB4 = 0. It can be easily verified that with the values of
these ancillary variables, deterministic inequalities (2.19) – (2.22) are equivalent to
the conditional equalities in (2.18).
Let EC denote the capacity of the PEV battery, and the state of charge (SOC)
ζ is defined as the battery energy level normalized by the battery capacity EC.
Assume the SOC of the battery at time of arrival is ζ0. During charging/discharging
over the time horizon L, lower and upper bounds of SOC, [ζ−, ζ+], are specified
to help protect the battery. For example, the lead-acid battery should not be
discharged below 50% [27], and for the Lithium-based battery, deep discharge
(depletion) should be avoided to prolong battery’s lifespan [28].
ζ− ≤
ζ0 · EC +
∑τ
τ ′=1 B˜τ ′
EC
≤ ζ+, τ=1, . . . , L. (2.23)
At the time of departure, i.e., τ = L, additional SOC constraint is needed such
that the SOC of PEV battery needs to be above a certain level ζd specified by the
customer, i.e.,
ζd ≤
ζ0 · EC +
∑L
τ ′=1 B˜τ ′
EC
≤ ζ+. (2.24)
If electricity prices are positive, the left inequality in (2.24) is always binding to
incur lowest cost. But for negative electricity prices, the battery may be charged
more at departure to earn money, or to offset paying for the same charge during
future intervals with positive prices.
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(5) Optimization formulation: The BEMC schedules battery operation to
minimize electricity cost, i.e.,
min
Bτ
L∑
τ=1
Bτ · κτ . (2.25)
Note that when in discharging mode, the customer actually sells back electric-
ity at whatever the price is at the time. The optimization for battery charg-
ing/discharging scheduling can be formulated given the objective (2.25) and con-
straints (2.11) – (2.24), which is a mixed-integer linear programming (MIP) prob-
lem.
2.4 Thermal Appliance Scheduling
Unlike washing machines or dishwashers, thermal appliances’ scheduling is related
to the thermal dynamics of the building and the customer’s comfort level. In
the following sections, we provide specifications of a building room prototype and
model the thermal dynamics of the building room using a set of linear differential
equations and the customer’s comfort level using the predictive mean vote (PMV)
index. Then we study how these two factors are incorporated in the scheduling
optimization for thermal appliances.
2.4.1 Thermal dynamics of building room
We consider a case from a multi-family home which has at least five housing units,
each of which must share at least a floor or a ceiling with another unit. The en-
velope geometry of this room prototype is shown in Figure 2.3(a). We apply a
29
typical floor plan assuming a single zone for the entire unit and no heat transfer
between the units, which is reasonable, since they are all similarly conditioned.
The building floor-to-floor height is assumed to be three meters. All the other
specifications of the building room prototype are based on the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (NREL) building America house simulation protocols [29], con-
taining the physical property of walls, floor, windows, and the typical parameters
for infiltration, internal gain, and system efficiency. These specifications can be
used to compute the thermal mass capacity and heat transfer coefficient described
in the next part. Due to the limit of space, these specifications are omitted here
and the reader can refer to [29] for more details.
(a) One building room prototype [30]
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Figure 2.3: Building room prototype and model
When thermal appliances, such as the electric heater and A/C are scheduled by
the BEMC, the whole building is a thermal dynamic system; the walls, floor, and
ceiling transfer heat to the room while serving as a thermal mass for heat storage.
The building thermal dynamic characteristics determine the heating and cooling
demands of the room under specified comfort levels and given weather conditions.
To optimize the schedules of the thermal appliances, we model the building thermal
system using a finite element discretization technique. The technique discretizes
the space into nodes and an element connecting nodes represents one heat transfer
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phenomena [31]. Figure 2.3(b) shows a simple 14-node model of the prototype
house; node 1 represents the ambient environment, which is used as the boundary
conditions for the thermal dynamics. Hence, we regard the temperature for node
1 to be known and use the typical meteorological year (TMY) weather data to
quantify it [32].
Except for node 1, the heat transfer equation per node can be formulated as
Mj
dTj(τ)
dτ
+
14∑
k=1,k 6=j
Sjk [Tj(τ)− Tk(τ)] = fj(τ), (2.26)
where Mj is the heat capacity of a building component represented by node j
and Mj
dTj(τ)
dt
is the dynamic heat change due to the thermal inertia of the mass;
Sjk is the heat transfer coefficient from node j to node k, by either conduction,
convection, or radiation. Tj(τ) is the temperature of node j at time slot τ . fj(τ) is
the external heat gain to node j at time slot τ , i.e., solar radiation, heat dissipation
from lighting and appliances, and the thermal appliances like the heater and A/C.
The thermal equations for all nodes at time slot τ can be written in a matrix
form as (2.27).
M
dT¯ (τ)
dτ
+ ST¯ (τ) = f¯(τ), (2.27)
where M = diag{Mj} is the thermal inertia matrix and S is the heat transfer
coefficient matrix. Vector T¯ (τ) and f¯(τ) represent temperature and external heat
gain for all nodes. Since the ambient environment (node 1) is used as the boundary
conditions for the thermal dynamics system, we remove the first row of M and S
so that only thermal dynamics of node 2 – 14 are formulated.
The external heat gain can be divided into thermal appliances, lighting, non-
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thermal appliances, and solar radiation, i.e., f¯ = f¯sloar+ f¯lighting+ f¯app+ f¯thermalapp.
Heat gains from solar radiation and lighting are considered as known whereas
heat gain from appliances is associated with decision variables in the optimization
scheme.
2.4.2 PMV comfort level
Another important constraint is the human comfort level, which represents the
thermal flexibility of the customer. We employ the PMV index [33]. PMV is an
index that predicts the mean value of the votes of a large group of persons on the
7-point thermal sensation scale, i.e., [-3,3] represents 7 thermal sensations from
cold to hot, to describe the thermal comfort level.
The calculation of PMV can be referred to the ISO 7730 standard [33], which
depends on several factors such as human metabolic rate, clothing insulation, cloth-
ing surface area factor, air temperature, mean radiant temperature (MRT), relative
air velocity, and relative humidity. In our studies, we evaluate how the tempera-
tures (air temperature ta and (MRT) t¯r) influence the PMV value, so we set all
other factors to be constant nominal values as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Parameters for PMV computation
Parameter Value
Metabolic rate 1 met = 58.2 W/m2
Clothing insulation 1 clo = 0.155 m2·◦C/W
Relative air velocity 0.5 m/s
Relative humidity 40 %
However, the calculation of PMV in [33] requires iterative numerical methods to
solve equations, which cannot be integrated into our optimization directly. Alter-
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natively, we vary the ta and t¯r from their normal range 10
◦C–30◦C and 10◦C–40◦C,
respectively, and compute PMV values using the iterative algorithm in [33], which
is shown in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: PMV data computed using iterative algorithm
We observe that all the PMV data points in Figure 2.4 follow a plane, so we
apply linear regression to estimate the two-variable linear function of PMV in terms
of ta and t¯r, which gives the function as
PMV = −3.923 + 0.133 · ta + 0.0577 · t¯r, (2.28)
with an error variance as low as 4.5113× 10−4.
2.4.3 Optimization formulation
The BEMC aims to schedule the thermal appliances’ power consumption Qτ to
minimize energy cost, given that the PMV is within a customer specified range
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over time horizon N , i.e.,
min
Qτ
N−1∑
τ=0
Qτ · κτ , (2.29)
where Qτ needs to follow the specification of the electric heater or A/C as
Q− ≤ Qτ ≤ Q
+, ∀τ, (2.30)
where Q− and Q+ are the lower and upper bounds of power consumption, respec-
tively.1
Thermal dynamic equations in (2.27) serve as equality constraints on the room’s
thermal evolution. To convert them into linear constraints, we employ approxi-
mated difference equations
M(T¯τ − T¯τ−1) + ST¯τ = f¯τ , ∀τ. (2.31)
The external heat gain of thermal appliance fthermalapp,τ in fτ takes effect in room
space (node 2), with the value of βQτ , where β is the heat efficiency for the thermal
appliance. So f¯thermalapp,τ can be expressed as (0, βQτ , 0, . . . , 0)
T. If the thermal
appliance is A/C for cooling, we can simply change the sign of f¯thermalapp,τ .
Given a PMV range [PMV −, PMV +] specified by the customer, the comfort
level constraint can be formulated using the linear regression result in (2.28) for
all time slots as
PMV −≤−3.923+0.133ta+0.0577t¯r≤PMV
+, ∀τ, (2.32)
1For the thermal appliances that only offer ON/OFF operation flexibility, binary variables
can be introduced, and the optimization problem will change to a mixed-integer programming
(MIP) problem.
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where ta is the room air temperature (T2), and the MRT t¯r of the room can be
expressed in an empirical formula [34] as
t¯r = [0.18× (T13+T14)+0.22× (T7+T8)+(0.3−0.01)
×(T6+T11)+0.01× (T4+T9)] /[2× (0.18+0.22+0.3)].
This PMV constraint in (2.32) is a linear inequality constraint. Combining the ob-
jective in (2.29) and constraints (2.30) – (2.32) gives a linear programming problem.
In the external heat gain vector f¯ , the solar radiation and the lighting part
f¯solar, f¯lighting can be viewed as fixed value inputs. The thermal appliance part
f¯thermalapp is the decision variable. The non-thermal appliance external heat gain
part f¯app can be divided into heat gain from non-schedulable (critical) appliances’
operation, f¯napp, and schedulable appliances’ operation, f¯
s
app. The latter depends on
the scheduling optimization discussed in Section III, i.e., there are coupling effects
on non-thermal appliances’ scheduling and thermal appliances’ scheduling. When
the customer requests to turn on a non-thermal scheduleable appliance (event i),
the following objective function is formulated
min
uki,τ ,y
k
i,τ ,z
k
i,τ ,Qτ
N−1∑
τ=0
(
STi∑
k=1
uki,τ · P
k
i +Qτ
)
· κτ , (2.33)
where the term in parenthesis denotes the total power consumption of both the
schedulable non-thermal appliance and thermal appliance. Note that the time
horizon N in Section III and Section IV may be different, so we set the time-
horizon in (18) as the maximum of these two values. The constraints for (18) are
(2) – (10) and (15) – (17) except that in constraint (16), the heat gain from non-
thermal schedulable appliances (all tasks from event i) is applied to the room air
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(node 2), i.e.,
f¯ sapp,τ = [0,
∑
k∈STi
γki u
k
i,τP
k
i , 0, . . . , 0]
T, (2.34)
where γki is the ratio of heat dissipation of task k of event i to its power consump-
tion. Once this appliance has been scheduled, the corresponding heat dissipation
part will be added to the heat gain from non-scheduleable appliances (f¯napp).
2.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we evaluate our proposed MPC-based appliance scheduling scheme.
Since current time-varying retail market prices are based on wholesale electricity
prices, in our simulations we employ the wholesale market prices directly as a proxy
for the time-varying retail prices.2 Specifically, we pick three pricing schemes for
city of Chicago (PJM) [35], and New York City (NYISO) [36], [37] shown in Table
2.2. The means κ¯ and standard deviations κstd of these three pricing schemes are
also compared in Table 2.2. We can see pricing scheme 1 has a lower average
Table 2.2: Pricing schemes comparison
Pricing Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3
Source Chicago [35] N.Y.C [36] N.Y.C [37]
Type day-ahead (hourly) day-ahead (hourly) real-time (10-min)
κ¯ ($/MWh) 36.2324 75.8323 75.7839
κstd 9.5389 32.7524 105.3502
price compared to pricing schemes 2 and 3. With the similar average price, pricing
scheme 3 has a higher standard deviation than that of pricing scheme 2.
To explore the energy-cost savings potential of our proposed scheme, we deploy
2The price forecasts are assumed to be perfect as the actual values in the simulation; thus the
results serve as upper bounds for the MPC method. Similar assumptions apply for the weather
forecast.
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the prototype residential case in two distinct climate zones [32]: Chicago and
Dallas, whose mean temperatures T¯ in winter and summer are shown in Table 2.3.
We can see that Chicago has a lower temperature in the winter, while Dallas has
a higher temperature in the summer.
Table 2.3: Average temperature comparison for two places
Data Season Chicago Dallas
T¯
Winter -3.97◦C 7.18◦C
Summer 22.42◦C 30.80◦C
Washing machines, clothes dryers, and dishwashers are delay flexible appliances
considered in the simulation. We categorize them into clothes washing event (Event
1) and dish-washing event (Event 2), each of which having four tasks. Note that
both the washing machine and clothes dryer are included in the clothes washing
event, where Task 4 is the operation of the clothes dryer. The parameters including
operation time, power consumption, and delay tolerance of each task are shown
in Table 2.4.3 The customers’ request times of these events are assumed to be
uniformly distributed from 10:00 AM to 10:00 PM in the simulation; however, in
practice, this distribution can vary according to customers’ power usage patterns.
Table 2.4: Appliances (events) parameters
Event Task Operation time Power Delay tolerance
E 1
Task 1 30 min 400 W 180 min
Task 2 20 min 600 W 30 min
Task 3 30 min 500 W 60 min
Task 4 50 min 2400 W 90 min
E 2
Task 1 30 min 1000 W 240 min
Task 2 40 min 1200 W 60 min
Task 3 30 min 800 W 60 min
Task 4 30 min 1300 W 120 min
3Since different devices have different specifications and operation modes, these parameters
are assumed values.
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The Nissan Leaf electric vehicle [38] is considered as the PEV prototype in the
simulation, which has a battery capacity of 24 kWh sufficient for driving up to
100 miles. Both charging and discharging have a maximum rate of 3kW and an
efficiency of 90%. We assume the arrival time is uniformly distributed between
5:00 PM to 7:00 PM, and departure time is uniformly distributed between 6:00
AM to 8:00 AM.
The duration of one time slot for scheduling is set to ∆ = 10 minutes in the
simulation, but the actual duration can be adjusted to other values in practice. In
the simulation, we assume the BEMC obtains real data for both electricity prices
and weather (temperature and solar radiation) in order to conduct the optimiza-
tion. In practice, the cost savings to customers will be lower due to forecasting
errors. The CPLEX 12.4 optimization solver [39] is used for MIP and linear pro-
gramming problems formulated in Sections III and IV. MATLAB 2009a is used
to formulate the problem and link the CPLEX solver. The simulation environ-
ment is of Intel Duo Core 2.0GHz with 2GB memory. The computation time for
thermal appliances scheduling optimization for each iteration (LP) is 0.03s, and
the time for joint non-thermal and thermal appliances scheduling optimization for
each iteration (MIP) is 0.27s.
(1) One-day scheduling results
Figure 2.5 shows the one-day scheduling results of the electric heater, clothes
washer/dryer, and dishwasher for pricing scheme 2. We can see during a low-
price period, the heater consumes more power and the PMV increases, i.e., the
building temperature increases (but it is still within the comfort level range) to
store heat. During the high-price period, the heater consumes less or zero power,
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making use of the stored heat in the building.
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Figure 2.5: One-day scheduling results for pricing scheme 2
Figure 2.6 show battery charging/discharging scheduling results for pricing
scheme 3. We can see that the optimization allows the battery to be charged at
low price periods, and discharged at high price periods. By the time of departure,
the customer is able to drive the PEV with proper SOC.
(2) Cost saving to customers
We evaluate the monetary cost saving to a customer for our MPC-based appliance
scheduling method over 40 consecutive days. Different pricing schemes and places
with different temperature profiles are compared. To compare the energy cost sav-
ing, in the following sections, we also implement a benchmark scheduling scheme,
in which non-thermal delay-flexible appliances are scheduled to operate without
delay as customers request, and thermal appliances are scheduled to operate under
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Figure 2.6: One-day battery scheduling result for pricing scheme 3
the same thermal dynamics and PMV comfort constraints without the objective
of minimizing the energy cost.
Table 2.5 compares the energy cost using our proposed method for the three
pricing schemes. We set the PMV comfort level bounds as [-0.5, 0.5], and consider
the heater in winter. We can see the electricity cost for pricing scheme 1 is much
lower than that for scheme 2, due to the low values for both the mean and standard
deviation of prices. With a similar mean value of prices for schemes 2 and 3, the
higher standard deviation for scheme 3 results in a lower cost. The saving for
scheme 3 almost reaches 20%.4
Table 2.5: Cost comparison for different pricing schemes
Pricing Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3
Energy Cost $34.09 $74.96 $56.42
Saving 10.76% 12.88% 19.74%
Figure 2.7 compares the energy cost (saving) for winter and summer cases of
4The actual saving will be less due to the assumption of the wholesale prices as the retail
prices, and in reality the wholesale price is only part of the retail price. Also the accuracy of the
model and prediction affect the cost saving.
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Chicago and Dallas, using the same pricing scheme 1. We can see in the summer,
since Dallas has a higher temperature (see Table 2.3), the energy cost is larger than
that in Chicago. In the winter, however, energy cost in Chicago is larger due to
the colder weather. In regard to the energy cost savings, which are also labeled in
Figure 2.7, we see that these four cases give similar cost savings. Together with the
results from Table 2.5, we can see the cost savings largely depend on the pricing
schemes.
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Figure 2.7: Energy cost comparison for winter and summer
(3) Impact of customers’ preference
Apart from the pricing and weather, the customers’ preference over operational
flexibilities of an appliance also plays an important role in energy cost savings. In
this subsection, we evaluate the influence of thermal comfort (PMV) and delay
flexibilities on energy cost savings.
Because customers will have diverse requirements in their comfort levels, the
energy cost for the thermal appliance varies. For example, the stringent comfort
range will not allow building thermal mass to store much energy;5 thus, this pro-
vides less flexibility to hedge against price spikes or take advantage of lower or even
5Here the energy means heat in winter, or coolness in summer.
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negative prices. Figure 2.8(a) shows the energy cost versus different PMV comfort
levels for a 40-day simulation. We can see the more relaxed thermal comfort levels
are, the less energy cost for customers. Consequently, these potential cost savings
may also change the comfort preference for some customers.
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Figure 2.8: Impact of customers’ preference
The customers may also have different delay tolerance flexibilities for their
(non-thermal) appliances. Figure 2.8(b) shows how the delay flexibilities impact
the energy cost savings. For a nominal delay tolerance Dki for each task, we vary
a delay ratio θ to uniformly describe the delay flexibilities, i.e., the delay tolerance
is θ · Dki . We can see that the energy cost saving increases as delay tolerance is
relaxed. In other words, customers with more (delay) operational flexibilities with
their appliances will enjoy more energy savings. However, we can also see from
Figure 2.8(b) that as delay tolerance increases, the cost savings saturate.
(4) Time horizon trade-off with price prediction uncertainty
In the MPC-based optimization, the time horizon N for planning is a significant
parameter. On the one hand, employing longer time horizons will account for
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more information in the future when making decisions; and thus, avoids short-
sightedness. On the other hand, the future forecast information, i.e., electricity
prices and weather data, usually have more uncertainty as the time horizon in-
creases; since our model uses the deterministic forecast, the uncertainty in forecast
incurs uncertainty to the results of our model. A trade-off lies between these two
extremes for N .
In the simulation, we evaluate how the uncertainty of electricity prices affects
this trade-off. Since the forecasts of electricity prices are not the focus of this
paper, in the simulation we model the uncertainty of price forecasts as the actual
data plus a noise distortion with a Gaussian distribution, i.e., κ′τ = κτ + δτ , where
δτ ∼ N (0, σ
2
τ ), and the variance στ increases with time τ . The optimization is
based on the distorted (forecast) electricity price data, but the billing applies actual
prices. Figure 2.9 shows the energy cost over the 40 days versus the time horizon
length, N , using pricing scheme 3.
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Figure 2.9: Time horizon length trade-off under price uncertainty
We can see when the time horizon length is small, the energy cost is higher due
to not including much future information. As the time horizon length increases,
the energy cost decreases. But excessively longer time horizons increase the energy
cost as the uncertainty of electricity price forecasts increases. For Figure 2.9, the
time horizon length of 6 hours gives the minimum energy cost. Note that Figure
43
2.9 is only an example to illustrate the time horizon length trade-off; however,
the optimal time horizon length for the actual BEMC scheduling depends on the
accuracy of the electricity price forecasts and variation of the prices.
2.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, an MPC-based appliance scheduling method is proposed for the
residential BEMC assuming time-varying retail pricing in place. Several types
of operational flexibilities of both non-thermal appliances and thermal appliances
are exploited to help customers save on electricity bills. In our models, the op-
erational dependence of non-thermal appliances is incorporated to further exploit
price variations. In the thermal appliance optimization problem, the thermal mass
of the building is modeled in thermal dynamics as linear difference equality con-
straints, in which the thermal appliances are scheduled smartly together with the
thermal mass storage to incur potential savings from time-varying pricing. Simu-
lation results demonstrate energy-cost savings using our method and the influence
of customers’ preferences is evaluated.
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Chapter 3
Residential Appliance Scheduling:
A Communication-based Control
Approach
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on how a consumer premise communication network (e.g.,
a home-area network) can be designed to permit load scheduling amongst flexible
and controllable loads. In contrast to other existing models of EMCs, our proposed
scheme alleviates the EMC of the communication and computation complexities
of directly scheduling each individual load in the consumer premise. The function-
alities of the EMC are reduced in our model to calculating a threshold maximum
power consumption for the premise (e.g., the home). We cast the calculation of
this time-varying threshold power as an optimization problem which accounts for
price variation and uncertainty due to local wind generation. Our proposed joint
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access and scheduling protocol describes how appliances access a common control
channel for coordination so that this total maximum demand target is not ex-
ceeded for each time slot. Unlike existing local area network (LAN) media access
protocols (e.g., Wi-Fi, G.hn, Zigbee), which could be used for one of several appli-
cations, our proposed scheme specifically addresses the load control problem. For
in-home scenarios, relatively short control messages are occasionally exchanged;
thus the approach can be easily implemented on higher data-rate LANs (such as
those listed above) that support other applications as long as the load control mes-
sages are given transmission priority. To provide analytical foundations, we study
the evolution of the protocol as a two-dimensional Markov chain and quantify the
average delay experienced by individual appliances.
Besides improving demand side management, the role of the EMC also involves
managing and making better use of local renewable distributed energy resources
(DERs). Existing regulations incentivize residential and small business consumers
to install renewable resources like solar panels and wind turbines [40]. Several
products and installation services of residential renewable DER are also currently
available [41]. As the penetration of these devices increases, the customers using
them will become increasingly interested in how to best manage the local electricity
supply and demand in the face of future pricing based DR mechanisms. To this
end, we formulate the EMC’s optimization of the target power value, which shows
how this target value can be computed so that it accounts for both price variation
and distributed wind power uncertainty. In this regard, we employ the Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to describe the stochastic property of power
generation from wind turbines.
We note that unlike existing studies on EMC design (e.g., [9], [42], [43], [44]), the
energy management approach presented here is tightly coupled with the underlying
46
communication algorithm used among the appliances. In this chapter, we present
the whole picture of the proposed protocol, with detailed analysis, and we discuss
how the protocol accommodates hard delay deadlines and any critical appliances
that must be turned on without delay. Simulation results verify our analysis and
demonstrate customers’ savings using this proposed scheme.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
joint appliance access and scheduling scheme for the EMC. Section 3.3 derives the
average delay of an appliance using Markov chain model. Section 3.4 formulates
an optimization for EMC to compute a target power budget. Numerical results
are presented in Section 3.5, and we summarize our discussion in Section 3.6.
3.2 Access and Scheduling Scheme for Appliances
3.2.1 Protocol description
We assume a HAN with N appliances that share a common control channel. Time
is segmented into scheduling frames, which are of the order of several (e.g., 5)
minutes, and there may be multiple scheduling frames in the duration between
target power updates. Let t denote the index of (scheduling) frame. Due to the
long frame and short packet durations in the proposed scheme, we assume that
collisions occur on the control channel with negligible probability.
We define the active set (At) as the set of appliances which are operating during
frame t. We also assign a leader appliance (ℓt) that broadcasts beacon signals and
makes admission control decisions during frame t. In a centralized scheme, the
in-home EMC could be the (static) leader; or in a distributed scheme, any one of
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the appliances in At can be the leader. Later in this section, we present a possible
leader assignment approach. Two types of appliances are considered in the home:
1. Critical appliances, that must join At immediately. Examples include light-
ing, medical devices, laptops, TV, etc.
2. Schedulable appliances, that can be powered on with a tolerable delay.
We first consider the case with only schedulable appliances and then discuss mod-
ifications to include critical appliances. Figure 3.1 shows the frame structure of
the proposed media-access and scheduling protocol. The frame consists of three
phases: power update, power request and power scheduling, with duration T1, T2
and T3, respectively.
PUM1 PUM2 PRM2PRM1Beacon
Power Update Phase (T1)
Power Request 
Phase (T2) Power Scheduling 
Phase (T3)
PSM
Figure 3.1: Frame structure of proposed protocol
(1) Power update phase (T1): Any active appliance which finishes its power
usage sends a power update message (PUM) packet, indicating the amount of
power the appliance is releasing. Any appliance that completes operation during
the other two phases waits until the next power update phase to transmit the PUM
packet. At the end of the power update phase, the leader appliance ℓt calculates
the remaining power budget:
P (t)r = Pmax,t −
∑
j∈At
Pj, (3.1)
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where P (t)r is the remaining power at time t, Pmax,t is the total demand target
value and Pj is the power usage for an appliance j. The leader then broadcasts
this information in the beacon signal, which marks the start of the second phase.
(2) Power request phase (T2): This phase is divided into time slots. In the
first slot, the leader appliance sends out a beacon signal indicating the remain-
ing power budget P (t)r . Any (schedulable) appliance, i, which wishes to join the
active set listens to the control channel and, upon receiving the leader’s beacon
signal, compares its requested power level with the remaining power budget. If
its requested demand exceeds the remaining power budget, i.e., Pi ≥ P
(t)
r , then
appliance i will defer requesting access to the active set until the next time frame.
Otherwise, it attempts joining the active set in the current frame. Appliances that
pass this “power check” enter into the feasible appliance set (Ft).
In order to be scheduled to power on, each appliance in Ft waits for a random
number of time slots (uniformly distributed over [1, w], where w is the number of
slots in this phase), and then sends out a power request message (PRM) packet
to request the power usage. Appliances in Ft whose PRM packets are received
correctly by the leader enter into the admissible appliance set (Dt). During this
time, the leader monitors the control channel and collects all the power request
information.
(3) Power scheduling phase (T3): During this phase, the leader appliance
makes an admission control decision, i.e., decides which (schedulable) appliances
in Dt can join the active set. These appliances form the newly admitted appliance
set (Nt). Several admission control methods will be discussed later in this section.
The leader then broadcasts a power scheduling message (PSM) packet, heard by all
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(including active) appliances. Upon reception of the PSM packet, the appliances
in Nt start consuming power immediately. Any non-admitted appliances will wait
until next frame to request again.
In the case that there is no EMC in the home (e.g., if the aggregator/utility
determines the target power and send this to the home), the first appliance which
powers on will be the leader and sends out the beacon signal to synchronize all
appliances in the system. Subsequently, the last admitted appliance (the one listed
last in the PSM message) is the leader for the upcoming frame. Thus, the role of
the leader could potentially change from one frame to the next.
3.2.2 Admission control methods (ACM)
When the total request power is greater than the remaining power budget, i.e.,∑
i∈Dt
Pi ≥ Pmax,t −
∑
j∈At
Pj, the leader appliance makes an admission decision.
We consider the following ACMs, though others are possible:
(1) Random ACM: The leader appliance randomly removes appliances from
the admissible set Dt to meet Pmax,t:
Step 1: Randomly remove appliance i from Dt. Let Dt = Dt\{i} and calculate
Pl =
∑
i∈Dt∪At
Pi − Pmax,t.
Step 2: If Pl ≤ 0, set Nt = Dt and stop; else go to Step 1.
50
(2) Max-power oriented ACM: The leader appliance maximizes the total
additional power supported without exceeding the remaining power budget:
max
xi
∑
i∈Dt
xiPi
s.t.
∑
i∈Dt
xiPi ≤ Pmax,t −
∑
j∈At
Pj
xi ∈ {0, 1}. (3.2)
This is a classical 0−1 knapsack problem, and can be solved using various existing
approaches, e.g., [45]. The newly admitted set can be chosen as Nt = {i|xi =
1, i ∈ Dt}.
(3) Max-appliance oriented ACM: The leader appliance selects in a way to
support maximum number of appliances:
max
xi
∑
i∈Dt
xi
s.t.
∑
i∈Dt
xiPi ≤ Pmax,t −
∑
j∈At
Pj
xi ∈ {0, 1}. (3.3)
The optimization problem in (3.3) can be solved by first sorting the requested
power of individual appliances in an ascending order. Without loss of generality,
we assume that P1 ≤ P2 ≤ · · · ≤ P|Dt|, where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
Then,
Nt =
{{
1, · · · ,max{iS}
}∣∣∣∣ iS∑
k=1
Pk ≤ Pmax,t −
∑
j∈At
Pj
}
.
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3.2.3 Critical appliance consideration
When a critical appliance has a power request, it starts operating immediately and
sends out PRM packets over the control channel. If there is sufficient power budget
to support this appliance, the leader simply needs to adjust the remaining power
level for use in admission control. Since all active appliances have access to the
control channel, they too can update their measurement of the remaining power
to account for the critical appliance’s power usage.
On the other hand, if there is not enough remaining power to accommodate the
current usage, then the leader must employ a curtailment control method (CCM).
Towards this end, the leader constructs the curtailable appliance set (Ct) from
the active set at each time t. If Ct 6= ∅, the leader selects a member of Ct that
needs to be removed from At. Similar to ACM, the CCM adopted by the leader
has three criteria: random curtailment; min-power curtailment; and min-appliance
curtailment. The reader is referred to [46] for details, where we also discussed the
case when Ct = ∅, and modification of the protocol when adding deadlines to the
appliances.
3.3 Markov Chain Analysis of the Protocol
In this section, we provide analysis to quantify the average delay performance
of our proposed scheme for schedulable appliances only. We focus on schedulable
appliances only as this assumption eases analysis. To do so, we model its stochastic
behavior as a two-dimensional, discrete-time Markov chain and derive its stationary
distribution. First, we define some additional appliance sets as follows: Released
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appliance set (Rt), comprising appliances that complete usage cycle during time
t; Joining appliance set (Jt), consisting of appliances that wish to join At during
time t; Arrival appliance set (It), containing appliances that request to power-on
during time t.
3.3.1 Power usage statistic
We assume a finite number L of power levels for all appliances. Let εl denote the
l-th power level, and without loss of generality we assume εl = lε. Appliances’
power draws are assumed to be random, with probability mass function (PMF) for
appliance with power level P = lε as pl , Pr(P = lε).
For a set of ω appliances and each appliance with power usage Pi, let PΣ =∑ω
i=1 Pi denote the overall power usage of appliances. Then the PMF of PΣ can
be written as
φΣ(ω, l0) , Pr(PΣ = l0ε) =
∑
Ω
pl1 · pl2 · · · plω , (3.4)
where
Ω=
{
(l1, . . . , lω) ∈ L
ω
∣∣ ω∑
i=1
li = l0, L = {1, . . . , L}
}
,
l0 ∈ {ω, ω + 1, · · · , ωL}.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of PΣ is, therefore, given by
Pr
(
PΣ ≤ P¯
)
=
⌊P¯/ε⌋∑
l0=ω
φΣ(ω, l0). (3.5)
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3.3.2 Two-dimensional discrete-time Markov chain model
Define the state S(t) = {|At|, |Jt|
∣∣|At| + |Jt| ≤ N}, for frame t, indicating the
number of active appliances and the number of appliances that wish to power on,
respectively. The evolution of S(t) can be modeled as two-dimensional discrete-
time Markov chain. From the structure of the protocol (see Figure 3.1), we have
At = At−1 ∪ Nt−1\Rt ⇒ |At| = |At−1|+ |Nt−1| − |Rt|;
Jt = Jt−1 ∪ It\Nt−1 ⇒ |Jt| = |Jt−1| − |Nt−1|+ |It|;
Nt ⊆ Dt ⊆ Ft ⊆ Jt ⇒ |Nt| ≤ |Dt| ≤ |Ft| ≤ |Jt|.
Let Θ
(t)
A,J (i, j) indicate the event that S(t) = {i, j}, i.e., in frame t, |At| = i,
and |Jt| = j. The state transition probability Pr
(
Θ
(t)
A,J (i, j)
∣∣Θ(t−1)A,J (n,m)) for this
two-dimensional Markov chain can be obtained as follows:
Pr
(
Θ
(t)
A,J (i, j)
∣∣Θ(t−1)A,J (n,m))
=Pr
(
|Nt−1|−|Rt|= i−n, |Nt−1|−|It|=m−j
∣∣Θ(t−1)A,J (n,m))
=
k0∑
k=0
Pr
(
|Nt−1| − |Rt| = i− n, |Nt−1| − |It| = m− j, |Nt−1| = k
∣∣ΘA,J (n,m))
=
k0∑
k=0
Pr
(
|Rt| = k + n− i
∣∣|Nt−1| = k,Θ(t−1)A,J (n,m))
× Pr
(
|It| = k + j −m
∣∣|Nt−1| = k,Θ(t−1)A,J (n,m))× Pr(|Nt−1| = k∣∣Θ(t−1)A,J (n,m))
=
k0∑
k=0
(
µ′Tf
)k+n−i(
λ′Tf
)k+j−m
(k + n− i)!(k + j −m)!
e−(µ
′+λ′)Tf × Pr
(
|Nt−1| = k
∣∣Θ(t−1)A,J (n,m)), (3.6)
where k0 = min{m,N − n}. Here, we assume each appliance’s power request and
power release to independently follow the Poisson distribution with rates λ and µ,
respectively. Then, given the number of active appliances in the previous frame
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(|At−1| = n) and the number of newly requested appliances in the previous frame
(|Jt−1| = m), we see that |It| and |Rt| follow a finite-sized queuing system with
rates λ′ = (N − n−m)λ and µ′ = nµ, respectively.
The second term in (3.6) can be written as
Pr
(
|Nt| = k
∣∣Θ(t)A,J (n,m))
=
m∑
p=k
p∑
q=k
Pr
(
|Nt| = k, |Dt| = q, |Ft| = p
∣∣Θ(t)A,J (n,m))
=
m∑
p=k
p∑
q=k
Pr
(
|Ft| = p
∣∣Θ(t)A,J (n,m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
P0
×Pr
(
|Dt| = q
∣∣|Ft| = p,Θ(t)A,J (n,m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1
× Pr
(
|Nt| = k
∣∣|Dt| = q, |Ft| = p,Θ(t)A,J (n,m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2
. (3.7)
(1) Calculation of P0: Given n active appliances and m appliances which wish
to join At, P0 is the probability that m − p appliances can not pass the power
check, i.e., their individual power request levels are greater than the remaining
power budget. The probability that an appliance i ∈ Jt has its individual power
request levels less than the remaining power budget is given by
αn,Pr
(
Pi≤Pmax,t−
∑
j∈At
Pj
∣∣∣|At|=n)=⌊Pmax,t/ε⌋∑
l0=n+1
φΣ(n+1, l0).
Thus, P0 =
(
m
p
)
αpn(1− αn)
m−p .
(2) Calculation of P1: Given p appliances in feasible appliance set (Ft), P1 is
the probability that exactly q appliances’ packets can be successfully received and
p−q appliances collide with each other when transmitting the PRM packets during
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the power request phase.
P1 = Pr
(
|Dt| = q
∣∣|Ft| = p)
= Pr
(
p− q collisions
∣∣q successes, |Ft| = p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P10
×Pr
(
q successes
∣∣|Ft| = p) ,︸ ︷︷ ︸
P11
(3.8)
where P11 =
w!
wq(w−q)!
. Let h denote the number of successful power request packets
sent among the remaining p− q appliances given the conditions in P10. Therefore,
P10=Pr (h=0)=1−Pr (h ≥ 1), where h ≥ 1 signifies that, among p−q appliances’
packets, at least one packet can be successfully received. Further, these packets
can only choose a back-off value among w − q numbers. Let Gi denote the event
that the i-th appliance out of p − q successfully transmits its packet given the
conditions in P10. Thus,
P10 = 1− Pr (h ≥ 1) = 1− Pr
(
p−q⋃
i=1
Gi
)
= 1−
p−q∑
j=1
(−1)j−1
(
p− q
j
)
(w − q)!(w − q − j)p−q−j
(w − q)p−q(w − q − j)!
. (3.9)
(3) Calculation of P2 Given n active appliances and q appliances in Dt, P2 is
the probability that k appliances are granted admission by the leader appliance.
We employ random ACM to analyze the admission success probability, where,
given |Dt| = q, q steps may exist for admission control. The admissible set at the
(i + 1)-th step is denoted D(i)t . Initially, we have D
(0)
t = Dt. Figure 3.2 shows the
. . .
1st step admission 
success
2nd step admission 
success
q-th step admission 
success
Figure 3.2: Admission success probability given |Dt| = q and |At| = n
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admission success probability given |Dt| = q and |At| = n. P2 can be regarded as
the admission success probability at the (q− k+1)-th step, and can be written as
P2 =Pr
(
|Nt| = k
∣∣|Dt| = q, |At| = n)
=Pr
(
admission success
∣∣ΨA,D(n, q), ∣∣D(q−k)t ∣∣ = k)× Pr(∣∣D(q−k)t ∣∣ = k∣∣ΨA,D(n, q))
=βq−k
q−k−1∏
j=0
(1− βj) (3.10)
where ΨA,D(n, q) =
{
|At| = n, |Dt| = q
}
. Given D(i)t , the admission success
probability βi indicates the probability that the total request power level in D
(i)
t is
less than the remaining power budget, i.e.,
βi
def
= Pr
(
admission success
∣∣|At|=n, ∣∣D(i)t ∣∣=q−i)=⌊Pmax/ε⌋∑
l0=q−i+n
φΣ(q − i+ n, l0), (3.11)
i = 0, · · · , q − 2 and βq−1 = 1. Finally, given P0, P1 and P2, we compute the
state-transition probability given by (3.6).
3.3.3 Steady-state distribution
Let πn,m , limt→∞Θ
(t)
A,J (n,m) denote the steady-state distribution. For (N +
1)(N +2)/2 states, the steady-state distribution vector is pi , [π0,0, π0,1, · · · , πN,0].
The steady-state distribution is obtained by solving pi = piP and pi1T = 1, where
the state-transition probability matrix P is given by (3.6). The marginal PMF
for |At| and |Jt| can be computed as: πn , Pr
(
|At| = n
)
=
∑N−n
m=0 πn,m; and
πm , Pr
(
|Jt| = m
)
=
∑N−m
n=0 πn,m. For further analysis, we define the following
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probabilities:
ξp , Pr
(
|Ft| = p
)
=
N∑
n=0
N−n∑
m=0
πn,mP0, (3.12)
ζn,q , Pr
(
|At| = n, |Dt| = q
)
=
N−n∑
m=0
m∑
p=q
πn,mP0P1. (3.13)
3.3.4 Delay analysis
Figure 3.3 shows the state transition diagram of the protocol, for one arbitrary ap-
pliance i in the system. Six states are considered for the appliance in this protocol.
Idle
Active
Power 
On
Power 
Check
Contention
Admission 
Control
(PAA; T3)
(1¡PAA; T1+T3)
(PCA; T2)
(1¡PCA; Tf )(1¡PPC; Tf )
(1; Tf=2)
(PPC; 0)
Figure 3.3: State transition diagram for an arbitrary appliance
An appliance is in the Idle state until it is requested into the Power On state
by the customer. When an appliance is requested to power on, it first enters the
Power Check state and correspondingly joins the feasible appliance set (Ft) in
phase T2. Next, the Contention state corresponds to joining admissible appliance
set (Dt) in phase T2 (or returning to Power Check state if contention is unsuccess-
ful). Admission Control is corresponds to joining newly admitted appliance set
(Nt) in T3 phase and becoming an Active appliance (or returning to Power Check
if admission is not granted). We now compute the power check success probabil-
ity (PPC), contention success probability (PCA) and admission success probability
(PAA).
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(1) PPC: Power check success indicates that an appliance i perceives its power
request level less than the remaining power budget, i.e., this appliance is in the
feasible appliance set Ft. Then, the power check success probability PPC , Pr(i ∈
Ft) is given by
PPC=
N∑
n=0
Pr
(
|At|=n
)
·Pr
(
a ∈ Ft
∣∣|At|=n)= N∑
n=0
πnαn. (3.14)
(2) PCA: Contention success indicates that no collisions happen when an ap-
pliance i ∈ Ft sends out the PRM packet and the leader appliance can receive
it without errors, i.e., this appliance is in the admissible appliance set Dt. From
(3.12), PCA , Pr(i ∈ Dt) is given by
PCA =
N∑
p=0
Pr
(
|Ft| = p
)
× Pr
(
no packet collision
∣∣|Ft|=p)
=
N∑
p=0
ξp
(
1−
1
w
)[p−1]+
, (3.15)
where [x]+ = max[0, x].
(3) PAA: Admission success indicates that the appliance i ∈ Dt can be granted
admission by the leader appliance, i.e., this appliance is in the new active appliance
set Nt. From (3.13), PAA , Pr(i ∈ Nt) is given by
PAA=
N∑
n=0
N−n∑
q=0
Pr
(
|At| = n, |Dt| = q
)
× Pr
(
a ∈ Nt
∣∣|At| = n, |Dt| = q)
=
N∑
n=0
N−n∑
q=0
ζn,q
[
β0+
q−1∑
i=1
q − i
q − i+ 1
βi
i−1∏
j=0
(1−βj)
]
. (3.16)
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We denote the average delay in the Power Check, Contention and Admission
Control states as TP, TC and TA, respectively. From the state-transition diagram
(see Figure 3.3), the average delay TD is given by TD = Tf/2 + TP, where
TP = PPCTC + (1− PPC)(TP + Tf ), (3.17)
TC = PCA(T2 + TA) + (1− PCA)(TP + Tf ), (3.18)
TA = PAAT3 + (1− PAA)(TP + T1 + T3). (3.19)
From (3.17) - (3.19), we have
TD =
Tf
2
+
Tf − PPCPCAPAAT1
PPCPCAPAA
. (3.20)
We can see if all three probabilities are 1, TD =
3Tf
2
− T1, which is the overhead of
a schedulable appliance joining the Active Set for this protocol. The smaller the
product of these three probabilities PPCPCAPAA is, the longer average delay an
appliance will have.
3.4 Optimization of Pmax,t for EMC
In this section, we formulate an optimization problem that helps the EMC decide
Pmax,t integrating the distributed renewable generation.
1 The EMC aims to min-
imize the total cost of electricity on a daily basis while considering variations in
electricity prices and uncertainty of local wind power generation. We assume that
the EMC has hourly day-ahead prices for the entire day and receives real-time
prices several minutes before each hour.
1We focus on the wind power here in the optimization; solar power can also be integrated if
proper prediction algorithms can be applied.
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3.4.1 Wind power statistics
We use wind speed data from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (Solar
Radiation Research wing), which is located at latitude 39.742◦ North and longitude
105.18◦ West. The elevation is 1828.8 meters. The data are gathered during the
following period: January 1st, 2009 to December 31st, 2009, with 10 minutes
sampling interval [47].
We model the stochastic behavior of wind power using the Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) technique, where the transition probability matrix is constructed
from the historical wind speed data and wind turbine power curve. This matrix
can be used to predict the wind power generation and aid in EMC scheduling
framework. Given the wind speed, the power output of the wind turbine can
be obtained from the power curves, which map the wind speed to wind turbine
generation. For our model, we use the RAUM ENERGYTM3.5kW wind turbine,
and the instantaneous system power curve is shown in its data-sheet [48], where
the wind power outputs form a set H with number of |H| = 11 states, i.e., s1,
. . . , s11 representing the |H| wind turbine generation values. For the first-order
Markov Chain (FO-MC), the state evolution can be described by the transition
probability matrix Q, whose entry qij represents the transition probability from
state i at frame t− 1 to state j at frame t, i.e., qij = Pr{Xt = j|Xt−1 = i}, which
is independent of frame t. Second and third order Markov chains can also be used
to describe the stochastic behavior. However, following the results in [49], these
models provide approximately the same level of modeling accuracy as FO-MC.
Thus, for simplicity in exposition, we choose FO-MC. Given the wind power data,
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qij can be estimated using the Monte Carlo method:
qij =
nij∑
k∈H nik
, (3.21)
where nij is the number of transitions from i to j encountered in the records.
Figure 3.4 shows the transition probability matrix Q obtained from the data. We
notice that the diagonal and near-diagonal entries dominate, demonstrating the
high auto-correlation of the wind power sequence.
1
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0
0.5
1
State j (1−11)
State i (1−11)
Figure 3.4: Transition probability matrix of wind power
3.4.2 Optimization formulation
Given Q and the initial state si0, an estimate of the expected value of wind power
at frame t is given by
W˜t =
|H|∑
j=1
sj
[
Qt
]
i0,j
, (3.22)
where [X]i,j indicates the entry with row i and column j in matrixX. We formulate
the optimization problem for the EMC at frame t0 with T -hour look ahead, K-min
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time slots in a rolling-based manner. Note that T = 24 is for daily optimization.
For each frame t, the EMC optimizes Pmax,t for Z = 60T/K cycles from t0, i.e.,
t ∈ [t0 + 1, t0 + Z], with the predicted values of wind power W˜t0+1 . . . W˜t0+Z using
the actual wind powerWt0 as the initial state in (3.22). The problem can, therefore,
be formulated as follows:
min
Pmax,t
t0+Z∑
t=t0+1
κt(Pmax,t − W˜t)
s.t. Lt + W˜t ≤ Pmax,t ≤ Ut + W˜t,
t0+Z∑
t=t0+1
Pmax,t ·
K
60
≥ Et0 . (3.23)
Here, κt is the electricity price with K-minute the interval. Since wind power
data intervals and pricing signal updates are 10-minute and 1-hour, respectively,
the optimization interval K can be chosen as 10 minutes. The price κt during
the first hour after t0 can be the real-time price (obtained several minutes before
that hour). The following prices can either use the forecast hourly price as shown
in [42], or the day-ahead price for approximation. Lt and Ut denote the lower and
upper bounds, respectively, for power consumption level at frame t. Et0 denotes
the minimum total power consumption for T hours horizon starting from t0. These
parameters can be determined by the EMC using learning algorithms that follow
the consumer’s usage patterns. Alternatively, we may select Lt as the aggregate
power consumption level by real-time appliances, i.e., Lt =
∑
i∈Vt
Pi+ δt, where Vt
denotes the set of critical appliances at frame t, while δt denotes the slack power
level that corresponds to critical appliances with cycle power (e.g. air conditioners).
Such a selection of Lt guarantees sufficient power budget to accommodate real-time
appliances. Additionally, Ut may be provided by the utility/aggregator to avoid
aggregate peak power. We note that, with additional (predicted) wind power, the
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lower and upper bounds for Pmax,t are adjusted accordingly in (3.23).
3.5 Numerical Results
We assume the time frame length Tf = 5 min, where T1 = 4.5 minutes, T2 =
29.9s and T3 = 0.1s. The beacon signal and each packet are 0.1s long, and thus
the number of slots in the power request phase is w = 298 (not including the
beacon signal). We consider L appliance types, and assume the power Pi = kε;
i = 1, · · · , N , k = 1, · · · , L, which is uniformly distributed, i.e., pk , Pr(Pi =
kε) = 1/L, to match our assumption in Section 3.3. Note that the proposed
protocol and our simulation approach itself do not require this uniform distribution;
the assumption is made here to validate our analysis. In the simulation results
presented, we choose L = 5 and ε = 100W. For simplicity, we assume all L
appliance types to have a duration of use that is exponentially distributed with
mean 1/µ.
(1) Delay Characteristics
We assume Pmax,t = Pmax and a fixed arrival rate of λ for all hours. First, in
Figure 3.5, we plot the average delay as a function of Pmax for different (λ, µ)
combinations.
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Figure 3.5: Average delay versus Pmax with various (λ, µ) (random ACM, N = 15)
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Results demonstrate that the average delay (i) decreases with increasing Pmax;
(ii) increases with appliance request (arrival) rate λ; and (iii) decreases with power
usage completion (departure) rate µ. We also plot the theoretical average delay,
given by (3.20), and see that it matches with the simulation results. We also
note that, as Pmax increases beyond a certain value, i.e., when the total power
consumption without scheduling is at most Pmax, the average delay converges to
the overhead of the protocol ≈ Tf/2 + T2 + T3 = 180s. This can also be seen from
(3.20) corresponding to PPCPCAPAA = 1.
2
In Figure 3.6, we plot the average delay as a function of the number N of
appliances with different ACMs. We see that the average delay increases as N
increases, since larger number of appliances cause more congestion. We also note
that the average delays of the three ACMs are comparatively close to each other.
From the plot we conclude that, since random ACM has linear implementation
complexity, it can be considered to be a desirable option.
N=11 N=12 N=13 N=14 N=15
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Number of appliances
Av
er
ag
e 
de
la
y 
(s)
 
 
Random ACM
Max power ACM
Max appliance ACM
Figure 3.6: Average delay versus N with various ACMs. (Pmax = 3000W, λ =
1/900, and µ = 1/3000)
Figure 3.7(a) shows the average delay versus the target power budget Pmax with
different number of critical appliances in the system. We only present results for
the random CCM policy as the performance of other schemes matches closely with
this. We see that with more critical appliances, the average delay for schedulable
2Since the numberN of appliances is not large, the PRM packet receiving probability PCA ≈ 1.
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appliances become larger. This is primarily due to the fact that when one schedu-
lable appliance is curtailed by the EMC/leader appliance, it needs to re-compete
with other appliances to join the active set. When accounting for all appliances,
it is interesting to note that the average delay is almost the same as the case of
no critical appliance, indicating the presence of critical appliances will not increase
the average delay in the system. Figure 3.7(b) shows the average curtailment with
different number of critical appliances. As expected, we see that with a larger
number of critical appliances or smaller Pmax, the average number of curtailment
becomes larger.
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Figure 3.7: Critical appliances effects. (N = 15, λ = 1/900, and µ = 1/3000)
(2) Load Scheduling Results
We plot the power consumption of the proposed scheme using an optimized Pmax,t
obtained from (3.23). We employ the price profile of 100 consecutive days as the
day-ahead location marginal price (LMP) in the New York City zone from archival
data (09/01/2011−12/31/2011) of New York ISO [36]. Given the wind power data,
the specified upper and lower bounds (Ut, Lt) and the total power consumption
constraint (Et0), the plot of the optimized Pmax,t for a day is shown in Figure 3.8(c).
For comparison, we also show the plot of Pmax,t which does not consider the wind
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power in Figure 3.8(b), i.e., W˜t = 0 in the optimization problem (3.23). The wind
power and electricity price profile for that day are shown in Figure 3.8(a). The
following comments are in order: (i) The optimization enables Pmax,t to be lower
during high-price periods and vice versa, which improves the customers’ savings in
energy cost; (ii) during periods of wind power, Pmax,t is higher, which encourages
customers to use the cheaper wind power, alleviating congestion in appliance access
and thereby lowering average delay for each appliance.
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Figure 3.8: Optimized power budget Pmax,t for a day
We note that the benefits discussed above depend on how closely the actual de-
mand using the proposed scheduling scheme approaches to the target value Pmax,t.
Figure 3.9 shows the scheduling results of our scheme using the power budget ob-
tained in Figure 3.8. Here, we vary the mean arrival rate of appliances based on the
time-of-day. Specifically, we assume an arrival rate of λ = 1/1800 during the hours
[1 : 7]; λ = 1/900 during the hours [8 : 17] and [23 : 24]; and λ = 1/200 during the
hours [18 : 22]. We see that, for both the cases of with and without wind power, the
scheduled total power consumption is below and close to the target value Pmax,t.
The proposed scheme enables powering-on of appliances to be scheduled as long
as the power budget is available. Further, the max-power ACM guarantees the
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smallest gap between actual consumption and the target power Pmax,t.
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(a) Total power consumption profile without wind power
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(b) Total power consumption profile with wind power
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Figure 3.9: Total power consumption under our scheme using Pmax,t with/without
wind power. (N = 25, µ = 1/3600 and random ACM)
Next, in Figure 3.10(a), we compare the cost of buying electricity from the grid
over 100 days under the proposed scheme, and the non-scheduling policy; both
policies consider the influence of wind power. We see that, with and without wind
power the cost saving using the proposed scheme is 34.11% and 33.73%, respec-
tively, better compared to the non-scheduling policy. The reason can be attributed
to the fact that optimized Pmax,t values encourage power usage during low price
periods, and the proposed protocol enables appliances to make the best effort to
approach the target without exceeding it. We also see that wind power integration
can further lower the cost by about 7.39% under our scheme, demonstrating the
benefits of using distributed renewable energy at the residential level. The saving
is further increased when wind power accounts for a larger portion of the overall
supply in-home.
Lastly, Figure 3.10(b) compares the average delay of our scheme with and
without consideration of the wind power. We see that the average delay with wind
power is slightly lower (6%) than that without wind power. This is because the
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optimized Pmax,t can be larger at the time when there is wind power; larger power
budget incurs less congestion and lower average delay.
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Figure 3.10: Comparison of electricity cost and average delay.
3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we propose a joint access and scheduling scheme for appliances
operating over a consumer-premise communication network. The scheme could be
incorporated in various DR schemes, such as smart pricing-based or DLC-based.
The scheme considers both schedulable appliances, whose powering-on can be de-
layed, and critical appliances that require real-time power usage. We model the
evolution of the protocol as a two-dimensional Markov chain and derive the av-
erage delay of an arbitrary appliance. We formulate an optimization problem for
the EMC, enabling it to compute the target power level for the home while incor-
porating effects of price variations and local wind power uncertainty. Simulations
verified the analysis and showed that the proposed scheme lowers electricity costs
for customers.
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Chapter 4
Reducing Peak Demand by
Real-time Pricing
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on demand response in the retail market, and study how
scheduling capability of certain types of flexible appliances combined with real-time
pricing (RTP) interact with objectives of the electric utility. RTP is considered
as a very direct and efficient approach for DR [50]. With RTP, the electricity
utility announces electricity prices on a rolling basis, i.e., the price for a given
time period (e.g., an hour) is determined and announced before the start of the
period (e.g., 15 minutes beforehand). With the development of smart metering
technologies [3], which will enable secure, reliable, real-time, and two-way infor-
mation exchange between consumers and their electricity service providers, these
RTPs can be provided to consumers multiple times a day, hour, or even second. To
handle the resulting data volume and decision making velocity, consumers will rely
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on energy management controllers (EMCs) [9], which are devices or programs that
use electricity prices and user preferences to modify power usage across a home or
building. From the service provider’s perspective, providing high frequency pric-
ing updates to EMCs will enable better load shaping and thus better matching
of volatile supply and demand. From the consumer’s perspective, RTP will pro-
vide new opportunities to lower rates, provided that they (i.e., EMCs) make smart
usage decisions.
Here we propose a smart RTP-based power scheduling scheme for residential
power usage using a Stackelberg game model. In this model, the electricity provider
plays the leader level game by setting the real-time price and the consumer’s EMC,
which schedules appliances in a home, plays the follower level game. The sequential
equilibrium is obtained through a two-way information exchange enabled by some
underlying communication infrastructure (e.g., the smart metering network). Re-
sults show that our scheme can alleviate peak load and reduce the variance between
the actual demand and desired demand profile set by the service provider/utilities,
which implies substantial cost and stability benefits for the service provider. At
the same time, we show that our approach can enable benefits for consumers as
well through reduced electricity bills.
The results and analysis in this chapter differ from the related work in several
aspects. In [44], consumers (i.e., EMCs) make decisions on their hourly aggregate
power consumption using current RTPs. Since individual devices have start and
end times that can be deterministic or random, or they may cycle on and off,
hourly aggregate consumption values may not be easily mapped to how each de-
vice or appliance is operated. By contrast, in our scheme, EMCs schedule power
consumption on an appliance-by-appliance basis. In [51, 52], the RTP scheme as-
sumes that the power consumption of each appliance can be modified to optimize
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power allocation during each hour. This assumption is suitable for a few devices
(e.g., electric vehicle batteries), but most end-use devices do not offer that level of
flexibility. On the other hand, several devices do offer flexibility regarding when
they are operated, and it is this ‘schedulability’ of appliances that we exploit to
demonstrate the power of RTPs and EMCs to collectively match demand with
supply. In [53], a bilevel model is proposed to convert the interaction between a
large customers with flexible loads and an electricity service provider into a lin-
ear programming problem, while in our approach the price is updated when each
appliance starts to consume power in a real-time manner.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 formulates
and analyzes the proposed Stackelberg game. Section 4.3 proposes algorithms for
our RTP-based power scheduling scheme. Section 4.4 presents numerical results,
and we summarize our discussion in Section 4.5.
4.2 Stackelberg Game Model Analysis
We consider a residential power system which consists of a service provider and
several consumers in a neighborhood, as shown in Figure 4.1. The service provider
buys electricity from the wholesale market and sells it to consumers. The EMC
in each home interacts with the service provider through an underlying two-way
communication network (e.g., the smart metering infrastructure). The EMC co-
ordinates power use among in-home smart appliances; of particular interest in our
model, it schedules the time of use of schedulable appliances within the home.
Time is divided into slots for scheduling and RTP updates. Let T denote the
set of time slots in a given time horizon, and N denote the set of consumers, where
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Figure 4.1: The interaction between consumers and electricity service provider
T , |T |, N , |N |. For each consumer n ∈ N , let An denote the set of schedulable
appliances in the home. For appliance a ∈ An, the operation duration is denoted
by ln,a, which will be set at the time of request, and the power usage for this
duration is cn,a kW.
We employ a Stackelberg game which is divided into two levels: the service
provider plays the leader level game and EMCs play the follower level game.
4.2.1 EMC/follower level decisions
The EMC aims to minimize the cost to the consumer for an appliance’s usage. Its
action is to determine the optimal start time s for a schedulable appliance that
was requested to turn on at time slot t0. Delaying the appliance to a cheaper price
period will save money, but this delay itself also incurs an inconvenience cost. We
assume each time slot of delay for appliance a ∈ An implies a cost of ψn,a dollars.
We assume the consumer specifies a maximum allowable delay of dn,a time slots
and the EMC is required to schedule all appliances within the horizon T . Given
the price vector Π = {π1, π2, · · · , πT} for the time horizon, the optimal scheduled
start time s∗ is obtained by solving the following optimization:
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min
s
(s− t0)ψn,a +
s+ln,a∑
r=s
πr cn,a
s.t. t0 ≤ s ≤ t0 + dn, s+ ln,a ≤ T. (4.1)
The minus of the objective function above thus forms the utility function for the
EMC follower game. In the objective function of (4.1), the first term represents the
delay cost incured by waiting a time of s− t0 slots to turn the appliance on. The
second term represents the money charged to the consumer by using this appliance.
Note that this minimization problem can be solved in O(dn,a · ln,a) time, which is
of polynomial complexity.
4.2.2 Service provider/leader level decisions
The service provider sets the retail price πt, which is the sum of the wholesale price
φt and the price gap ǫt. In our model, the wholesale price affects EMCs’ scheduling
so that peak load is reduced while the price gap enables the actual load to be more
close to the planned supply. The wholesale price φt is defined as φt = Ct(qt)/qt,
where qt in kW is the planned supply load for time slot t and forms the vector
Q = [q1, q2, · · · , qT ] for the time horizon. Ct(qt) is the cost function [52], which we
assume is an increasing and strictly convex function of qt; thus φt is higher during
high load periods than during low load periods. We can choose the cost function
as Ct(qt) = αq
2
t , where the coefficient α converts the cost to a monetary value. In
this case, φt = Ct(qt)/qt = αqt.
The price gap ǫt is designed to influence the difference between the actual
demand and the available supply. The service provider maintains a real-time load
vector Z = [z1, z2, · · · , zT ] in kW which tracks the aggregated load for the time
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horizon T . We design ǫt such that it is proportional to a function g(qt, zt, w), which
decreases with δt = qt − zt, i.e., the larger δt, the lower price gap ǫt so that the
EMC is more willing to schedule the appliance to operate during this period, and
vice versa. In this paper, we adopt g(qt, zt, w) as:
1
ǫt ∝ g(qt, zt, w) =


1
(qt−zt)w
, if qt > zt
(zt − qt)
w, if qt < zt
1, if qt = zt;
(4.2)
where w is an incentive factor.
We assume a constraint for the price gap which can be seen as the effect of
either market competition or price caps set by some regulatory body. For an
appliance’s request at t0, this constraint is
∑T
t=t0
ǫt = Mt0 =
∑T
t=t0
ǫ0, where ǫ0 is
the comparable constant price gap in some (alternate) fixed rate pricing scheme.
The price gap ǫt is expressed in terms of g(qt, zt, w) as:
ǫt =
g(qt, zt, w)∑T
t=t0
g(qt, zt, w)
Mt0 . (4.3)
The retail price πt is then:
πt = φt + ǫt = αqt +
g(qt, zt, w)∑T
t=t0
g(qt, zt, w)
Mt0 . (4.4)
Given the scheduled start time s, cn,a and ln,a, the service provider forms a
power consumption vector Pn,a = [p
1
n,a, p
2
n,a, · · · , p
t
n,a, · · · , p
T
n,a] in kW for this ap-
1We round qt and zt to integer numbers in kW.
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pliance, where
ptn,a =


cn,a, t ∈ [s, s+ ln,a)
0, t ∈ T \ [s, s+ ln,a).
(4.5)
The real-time load vector is then updated as
Z ′ = Z + Pn,a = [z
′
1, z
′
2, · · · , z
′
T ]. (4.6)
The utility function of the service provider is defined as the gross profit, GP ,
which is
∑T
t=1 πt · p
t
n,a, minus the cost of this usage to the provider. This cost
has two parts: One cost Ce comes from purchasing electricity for this appliance
usage from the wholesale market, i.e., Ce =
∑T
t=1 φt · p
t
n,a; the other cost Cm is
due to the “mismatch” between the actual load and planned supply caused by this
appliance, i.e., Cm = β
[∑T
t=1 (qt − z
′
t)
2 −
∑T
t=1 (qt − zt)
2
]
, where β is a coefficient
that converts the cost to a monetary value.
The service provider will maximize its utility by choosing incentive factor2 w;
this optimization problem can be written as
max
w
T∑
t=1
ǫtp
t
n,a −β
[
T∑
t=1
(qt − z
′
t)
2−
T∑
t=1
(qt − zt)
2
]
. (4.7)
4.2.3 Equilibrium of the Stackelberg game
For each w chosen by the provider, there is a corresponding retail price vector
Πw. Using these price vectors, the EMC can determine an optimal start time sw
for the appliance under consideration. The sequential equilibrium for this game is
2There is a trade-off in selecting w: Larger w provides more incentive for shifting the current
appliance’s load to a period with a larger δt value (thus reduces the mismatch cost Cm). But
larger w also reduces the money charged to the consumer, and therefore the gross profit.
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the set of values (w∗, s∗) such that the optimal start time s∗ corresponding to the
price vector Πw
∗
maximizes the provider’s utility function, i.e. implying that w∗
is optimal.
Using backward induction [54], the sequential equilibrium can be solved ana-
lytically. On the other hand, we can simplify the optimization problem in (4.7)
by discretizing the set of feasible values of w as W = {w1, w2, · · · , wW}, where
W , |W|. Then the optimization problem in (4.7) can be rewritten as
max
w∈W
T∑
t=1
ǫtp
t
n,a −β
[
T∑
t=1
(qt − z
′
t)
2−
T∑
t=1
(qt − zt)
2
]
. (4.8)
In this simplified model, the sequential equilibrium (s∗, wˆ∗) ∈ S × W can be
achieved through information exchange taking advantage of the two-way commu-
nication network.
4.3 RTP-based Power Scheduling Scheme
In a neighborhood scenario which contains N EMCs and thus
∑N
n=1 |An| appli-
ances, the service provider can use its pricing scheme to influence the aggregate
load from all these scheduled appliances. For example, in day-ahead pricing (where
the prices for each time period in the next day are set a day in advance), each
home’s EMC can schedule appliance usage to avoid high load (and thus high cost)
periods. However, since local neighboring EMCs may make similar usage decisions,
the aggregate load for the neighborhood may not experience peak load reduction
since a “rebound” peak may appear during what was supposed to be a low load
(i.e., low cost) period. Our scheme, presented here as set of interactive algorithms
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(Algorithm 1 for the provider, Algorithm 2 for the EMC3), alleviates this problem
by updating the price according to the real-time load vector Z ′. In this way, a new
appliance’s scheduled use will affect future prices and thus the scheduling decisions
for future appliances.
Algorithm 1 Executed by the service provider
1: Initialization.
2: repeat
3: if receive request signal from EMC n for app a then
4: for w=w1 to wW do
5: Compute the price vector Πw using (4.4).
6: Send Πw to EMC n.
7: for all start time s∗,w received do
8: Solve (4.8) to find the optimal wˆ∗.
9: end for
10: Send the wˆ∗ to EMC n, and update Z as (4.6).
11: end for
12: end if
13: until The end of the day
Algorithm 2 Executed by EMC n
1: Initialization.
2: if consumer n has a request for appliance a at t then
3: Send the request signal to service provider.
4: for all price vector Πw received do
5: Solve (4.1) to find optimal s∗,w for each w.
6: Send s∗,w to the service provider.
7: end for
8: if receive the optimal wˆ∗ from provider then
9: Select s∗ = s∗,wˆ
∗
and schedule the appliance a.
10: end if
11: end if
3Both provider and EMC can compute and receive data simultaneously.
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4.4 Numerical Results
We simulate a neighborhood consisting of 80 consumers, and each consumer has
3 schedulable appliances, i.e., dishwasher, clothes dryer and clothes washer, con-
trolled by the EMC. We assume ln,a has an exponential distribution with mean of
l¯n,a. We assume homogeneous end-use consumers, i.e., cn,a=ca, dn,a=da, ψn,a=ψa,
and l¯n,a= l¯a. In this simulation, we further assume a time horizon of one day, start-
ing from 7:00 AM until the 7:00 AM the next day. Appliances have an on-peak
period from 5:00 PM to 8:00 PM, during which time they are requested by con-
sumers with higher probability. We divide time into 10 minute scheduling/pricing
slots and use the appliance parameters given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Appliances’ parameters for each home
Appliance ca(kW) da(hr) ψa($/hr) l¯a(hr)
Dishwasher 1.8 6.0 0.10 3.0
Clothes Dryer 3.4 4.0 0.25 1.0
Clothes Washer 0.4 2.0 0.40 0.5
(1) Benefits to the service provider
Figure 4.2 compares non-scheduling aggregate demand for the neighborhood to
the load using our RTP-based scheduling scheme. For reference, we also plot the
planned supply curve. Without RTP-based power scheduling, the peak load is
102.2 kW at 6:50 PM, while our scheme has a 28.9% lower peak load of 72.8 kW.
At the same time, our scheduled consumption curve is much closer to the planned
supply curve, i.e., the deviation of the non-scheduled demand curve to the supply
curve is 28.3%, which reduces to 16.1% under our scheme.
In Figure 4.2 we also compare the demand curve for our scheme with the
demand curve using day-ahead pricing, where each local EMC makes decisions
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Figure 4.2: One-day power usage comparison
based on the same day-ahead prices. From the plot, we can see that at 6:50 PM,
where there is an original peak load, both our real-time pricing and the day-ahead
pricing schemes reduce demand by 28.9% and 71.7%, respectively. However, at
8:20 PM, the demand curve for day-ahead pricing exceeds the planned supply load
by 81.7%, thereby producing a “rebound” peak. In contrast, our scheme has no
such rebound effects.
(2) Benefits to consumers
Next, we examine the benefits of our proposed scheme for consumers. To do so, we
plot in Figure 4.3, the costs (using the objective function in (4.1)) for 10 random
consumers for our scheme, the non-scheduling approach and scheduling based on
day-ahead prices. Compared to the non-scheduled curve, consumers see a 9.46%
reduction in cost for our scheme; while for the day-ahead prices scheme, cost saving
is only 5.84%. When considering only electricity costs (i.e., electricity bills), the
savings of our proposed scheme is 24.22% over the non-scheduled case, compared
to 14.63% savings for the day-ahead scheme.
Our simulation results further show that these cost reductions for the consumers
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Figure 4.3: Money saving evaluation (100 days)
are consistent across the neighborhood of homes. That is, based on a 100-day
average, we observed that the standard deviation in the electricity bills across the
80 homes is within 2.5% of the average electricity bill for the same consumption
level. This demonstrates the fairness of our pricing scheme from the consumer’s
perspective.
4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we propose a RTP-based power scheduling scheme as a demand re-
sponse mechanism for residential electric power consumption. A Stackelberg game
model is formulated to analyze the interaction between a consumer’s EMC and
the service provider. Our scheme can reduce peak load and the mismatch between
actual load and planned supply, while avoiding a rebound peak. Using EMCs, con-
sumers can exploit the proposed real-time prices to reduce their electricity bills.
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Chapter 5
Matching Demand and Supply: A
Distributed Direct Load Control
Approach
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, instead of the pricing-based method for DR at the retail market
level, we focus on an alternative direct load control (DLC) approach, and an in-
novative distributed direct load control scheme is proposed here to better match
demand and supply. The approach utilizes the underlying two-layer communi-
cation networks, as shown in Figure 5.1. Specifically, the lower-layer network is
within each building, where the energy management controller (EMC) schedules
operation of appliances upon request according to a local power consumption tar-
get via wireless links. The upper-layer network consists of EMCs in a region of
which demand is served by a load aggregator. The load aggregator wants the ac-
82
tual aggregated demand over this region to match a desired aggregated demand
profile determined day-ahead, which is viewed as supply from customers’ perspec-
tive. Our approach utilizes the average consensus algorithm to distribute portions
of the desired aggregated demand to each EMC in a decentralized fashion. The
allocated portion corresponds to each building’s local power consumption target
which its EMC then uses to schedule the in-building appliances. The result will
be an aggregated demand over this region that more closely reaches the desired
demand.
LowerͲLayer NetworkUpperͲLayer Network
EMC

Figure 5.1: Two-layer communication-based control structure
Current DLC programs provided by utilities are usually contract-based, i.e., by
signing up for the contract, customers give utilities the option to remotely shut
down appliances during high-demand periods or power supply emergency, and
receive credit on electricity bills for this participation. Examples of this kind of
DLC program include Contracted Direct Load Control by Wisconsin Public Service
[7] and Distribution Load Relief Program by conEdison [8]. Several limitations
exist for these types of DLC programs. Firstly, they are only for emergency cases so
that they do not fully exploit the operational flexibilities of appliances which have
greater and longer-term potential for balancing supply and demand. Secondly,
when there are a large number of customers, there are huge computational and
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communication burdens placed on the centralized controller. Another limit is due
to privacy concerns that customers may have since their usage profile is exposed
each time an individual appliance is remotely controlled by the central controller.
Whereas there are many existing studies that examine pricing-based approaches
for the retail market level DR (e.g., see [42], [44], [55], [56] and references in Chap-
ter 4), there are much fewer papers that look at how direct load control may
be conducted under the emerging smart grid infrastructure. Alizadeh et al. [57]
proposed a digital direct load control method that categorizes appliances into dif-
ferent queues according to their power consumption request profile, so control of
the deferrable load is equivalent to management of the queue parameters, and
the control is conducted in a centralized way. [58] proposed a ColoredPower dis-
tributed algorithm with a probability control method for each appliance such that
the switch-on/off decision is based on the probability reflecting the overall supply-
demand conditions. However, some parameters of individual appliances still need
to be transmitted to the central controller, which incurs a communication burden
in larger system.
Our approach has the following advantages compared to the existing methods
for large-scale residential DR implementation:
a. Low complexity for communication and computation: The distributed
algorithm in the upper-layer network that sets local power consumption targets
involves only local communications between neighboring EMCs. This approach
is therefore of low complexity compared to the centralized method which requires
links between each EMC and the centralized controller. Scheduling is conducted
in each building by its EMC which incurs lower computation complexity than if
the centralized controller made such decisions for each appliance in each building
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over the larger region.
b. Powerful load shaping tools to alleviate the mismatch between demand and
supply: By dividing the desired demand among each building’s local power con-
sumption target and designing EMCs that exploit load flexibilities to closely meet
these targets, the mismatch between the actual aggregated demand and the desired
demand can be alleviated.
c. Privacy protection for customers: In our approach, only the aggregated
power consumption information of customers is visible in the upper-layer network.
Thus, individual appliance usage profile of customers is kept private.
d. Fairness: In the proposed scheme, the local power consumption targets for
each building are set according to DR resources each customer can provide, with
no bias to any individual customer.
e. Non-intrusiveness for appliance operation: Our approach integrates non-
intrusiveness features for appliance scheduling. This includes options for overriding
the control of the EMC, a scheme for preventing frequent ON/OFF switch, and
for guaranteeing operation deadlines.
f. Reliable and robust: Since local power consumption targets are set in a
distributed manner, our approach does not rely on a central controller for the load
aggregator, which implies our scheme is more reliable and robust.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the
problem and proposes our distributed DLC architecture. Section 5.3 discusses the
distributed demand target allocation in the upper-layer EMC network. Section
5.4 discusses the lower-layer communication and control scheme used by the EMC
in each building. Section 5.5 provides numerical results for our approach and we
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conclude our discussion in Section 5.6.
5.2 Problem Formulation
We consider a region with B buildings whose power consumptions are served by
a load aggregator. The set of buildings is denoted by B. Each building i ∈ B has
a set of appliances which is denoted by Ki. Among these appliances, some are
flexible in operation such that they can be switched on either when requested or
possibly some time later. The aggregator serving this region has a desired demand
Zτ for each time slot τ , where the unit of τ can be one hour or several minutes
depending on the granularity of the design. The desired demand Zτ can be the day-
ahead cleared demand bid that the load aggregator submitted into the wholesale
electricity market. In real-time, day-of operations, the load aggregator wants the
actual aggregated demand of the B buildings over this region to be lower than
Zτ such that the demand commitment in day-ahead (Zτ ) always fulfills the actual
demand; meanwhile the actual aggregated demand should be as close to this Zτ as
possible in order to minimize the deviation cost.
Instead of a centralized direct load control method, we propose a two-layer
communication-based distributed direct load control scheme, shown in Figure 5.1.
Each building is equipped with an EMC which locally schedules operation of ap-
pliances within the building via a lower-layer (wireless) network. These EMCs are
connected by a upper-layer network without a central controller, i.e., each EMC
only communicates to its neighboring EMCs.
The main idea underlying the proposed approach is to allocate the desired
demand target value Zτ to each EMC via its local power consumption target. This
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target is used by the EMC to control appliance operation within the building.
Thus, the actual aggregated demand can approach the target Zτ . To reach this
goal, two problems need to be solved:
1) How is the local power consumption target within each building computed
utilizing the upper-layer network?
2) Within each building, how does the EMC schedule appliances in real-time
to reach the local power consumption target, and how are the two-layer processes
integrated into a protocol?
In the following sections, we will address how these two problems are tackled
in our proposed approach.
5.3 Distributed Demand Target Allocation
Let θτi denote the local demand target set by the EMC within building i for time slot
τ . We design a distributed scheme to compute this θτi so that scheduling appliances
locally within each building can result in aggregated demand that approaches the
desired demand Zτ .
5.3.1 Allocating demand target (Zτ) to EMCs
Let q˜τi denote the overall power request from delay flexible appliances within build-
ing i for time τ . This information can be collected via the lower-layer network
which will be discussed in the Section 5.4. These flexible appliances serve as de-
mand response resources that the EMC can exploit to control overall load of the
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building. The total demand from already turned-on appliances, i.e., fixed demand,
within building i for time τ is denoted by qˆτi . We design ητ as the ratio of the total
demand target gap, Zτ −
∑
i∈B qˆ
τ
i , to the total demand from flexible appliances,∑
i∈B q˜
τ
i , i.e.,
ητ =
Zτ −
∑
i∈B qˆ
τ
i∑
i∈B q˜
τ
i
, (5.1)
and the EMC for building i applies this ratio ητ to set its local target power
consumption target, θτi , as
θτi = qˆ
τ
i + ητ · q˜
τ
i . (5.2)
If each EMC schedules appliances to follow this target value θτi , then we get
∑
i∈B
θτi =
∑
i∈B
qˆτi + ητ
∑
i∈B
q˜τi = Zτ , (5.3)
i.e., the aggregated target demand matches the desired demand Zτ for time τ . In
this approach, the status of aggregated demand reflected by the ratio ητ is applied
in the local target demand computation for each EMC. Besides guaranteeing the
fixed demand qˆτi , the additional part of the local target demand θ
τ
i in building i
is proportional to the demand of delay flexible appliances requested in time τ . In
other words, this demand target allocation is unbiased to each individual customer,
only depending on demand response resources.
If there exists a central controller for the aggregator, all EMCs send the fixed
demand qˆτi and flexible demand q˜
τ
i to the central controller, which then computes
the ratio ητ according to (5.1), and the central controller then broadcasts this ητ
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back to each EMC. However, the up-link in this scheme will suffer from high com-
munication complexity when the number of EMCs becomes large; meanwhile, this
centralized approach is also vulnerable due to its reliance on the central controller,
which can be a single point of failure of the system.
An alternative approach is to employ a distributed method, in which the local
demand target θτi is computed at each EMC side via information exchange with its
neighboring EMCs using the upper-layer network shown in Figure 5.1. Although
q˜τi and qˆ
τ
i are different for each building, the summation
∑
i∈B qˆ
τ
i and
∑
i∈B q˜
τ
i are
the same for all EMCs, so they can be viewed as a consensus point that all EMCs
reach. In this way, the average consensus algorithm [59] and [60] can be applied to
compute the ητ iteratively.
5.3.2 Distributed consensus algorithm to compute θτi
The topology of the upper-layer network of EMCs can be represented by an undi-
rected graph G = (V , E) with the set of nodes V = {1, 2, . . . , B} and edges
E ⊆ V × V . The connectivity of the graph G is described by the adjacency matrix
A with its entries as
Ai,j =


1, (i, j) ∈ E ,
0, otherwise.
(5.4)
The set of neighbors of an EMC i is denoted by Ni, where Ni = {j ∈ V : Ai,j 6= 0}.
By employing the average consensus algorithm [59] and [60] over a connected graph,
each EMC i updates qˆτi and q˜
τ
i iteratively as the following steps (k as the iteration
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index)
qˆτi (k + 1) = qˆ
τ
i (k) + ε ·
∑
j∈Ni
[
qˆτj (k)− qˆ
τ
i (k)
]
, (5.5)
q˜τi (k + 1) = q˜
τ
i (k) + ε ·
∑
j∈Ni
[
q˜τj (k)− q˜
τ
i (k)
]
. (5.6)
The values of all qˆτi and q˜
τ
i will converge to the average value qˆ
τ∗ and q˜τ∗, respec-
tively, with a proper step size ε. After the updates converge, the global ratio ητ
can be computed at each EMC side as:
ητ =
Zτ − B · qˆ
τ∗
B · q˜∗t
, (5.7)
where the overall desired target demand, Zτ , and total number of EMCs B, are
known to all EMCs beforehand.
The convergence of the average consensus algorithm in (5.5) and (5.6) is re-
lated to the graph Laplacian matrix of the network graph G, which is denoted by
L such that L = D − A, where D = diag{d1, . . . , dB} is the degree matrix of G,
with di being the number of neighbors of node i with which it can communicate
reliably, i.e., di = |Ni|. Given this matrix L, it can be shown that L1 = 0 and
1TL = 0T, where 1 = [1, . . . , 1]T, and 0 = [0, . . . , 0]T with proper size. Addition-
ally, L is a symmetric positive semi-definite matrix, and for a connected graph,
the rank of L is B − 1 and its eigenvalues can be arranged in increasing order
as 0 = λ1(L) < λ2(L) ≤ · · · ≤ λB(L) [61]. From [60] and [62], it can be shown
that for a time-invariant, connected, undirected network, when ε ∈ (0, 2/λB(L)),
average consensus can be asymptotically achieved. Specifically, the minimal con-
vergence time is obtained when ε = 2/[λ2(L)+λB(L)] [62], i.e., the second smallest
eigenvalue of graph Laplacian quantifies the speed of convergence of consensus al-
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gorithms.
In regard to convergence speed, [63] shows that a discrete-time consensus is
globally exponentially reached with a speed that is faster or equal to κ2 = 1 −
ελ2(L) for a connected undirected network. This property helps in designing the
network topology to achieve a better trade-off between the infrastructure cost and
convergence rate. Figure 5.2 shows four typical network topologies of 20 nodes,
where the second largest eigenvalue of graph Laplacian, λ2(L), and the convergence
speed parameter κ2 of each network is computed and shown in the figure. We
(a) Ring network, λ2(L) =
0.0979, κ2 = 0.9522
(b) Mesh network, λ2(L) =
0.382, κ2 = 0.897
(c) Star network, λ2(L) =
1.00, κ2 = 0.9048
(d) Small world network
[64], λ2(L) = 1.0794, κ2 =
0.7846
Figure 5.2: Four sample networks with 20 nodes
can see among these four networks, the small-world network has the lowest κ2
values, indicating the fastest convergence speed. This can be verified in Figure
5.3 where the convergence for these four sample networks are illustrated. The
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Figure 5.3: Convergence properties for four networks
convergence speed can also help design the parameters of the communication and
control protocol to guarantee that the distributed method gives an accurate result;
this will be discussed in Section 5.4.
Given the ratio ητ from the average consensus algorithm, the local power con-
sumption target θτi for building i can be computed locally according to (5.2). De-
pending on the values of ητ , three scenarios need to be considered:
If ητ ≤ 0, i.e., the desired demand Zτ is less than the aggregated fixed demand,
the local power consumption target could be set as the its fixed value, qˆτi , by letting
ητ = 0. In this case, all flexible appliances will not be turned on during that time
slot, and a deviation cost will be incurred in order to fulfill the fixed demand.
If 0 < ητ ≤ 1, i.e., the current demand from delay flexible appliances’ request
is larger than the desired demand less the overall fixed demand, then θτi can be
computed directly using (5.2).
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If ητ > 1, then the local power consumption target can be set as θ
τ
i = qˆ
τ
i + q˜
τ
i ,
i.e., by letting ητ = 1. This represents the best effort that the EMC can do to
schedule appliances at time τ to reach the target. On the other hand, if battery
storage is locally available and can be utilized, this gap can be filled. But this
scheme needs to quantify the fairness of the batteries’ charging allocation among
customers as well as other constraints for batteries; these issues are left for future
work.
The distributed algorithm proposed here only requires local communication
between neighboring EMCs, and does not rely on a central controller. In addition,
since only aggregated information of each building, qˆτi and q˜
τ
i , are transmitted
(instead of individual appliance information), customer privacy is better protected.
5.4 Lower-Layer Communication and Admission
Control Scheme
Each EMC i in the lower-layer network has two tasks: 1) Collect power request
information from appliances within the building and update the qˆτi and q˜
τ
i for
upper-layer consensus algorithm to compute θτi . 2) Conduct admission control for
delay flexible appliances to decide whether they can be turned on to achieve the
local power consumption target θτi . Before providing details on how these two tasks
may be executed, we first describe the structure of our two-layer communication-
based control approach, as shown in Figure 5.4.
Time is segmented into frames which last as long the slot τ used in Section 5.3.
Each frame τ has three phases:
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UpperͲlayer
communication
IDLE IDLE
ACPLIUP ControlTUP LIUP
LowerͲlayer
communication
Decision&Beacon
IDLE
Framet
Figure 5.4: Two-layer communication and control protocol
(1) Load Information Update Phase (LIUP): During the LIUP, the lower-
layer communication interface module receives the power-on requests and power-
off requests from appliances in the building. With this data collected, the control
module updates the flexible load q˜τi and fixed load qˆ
t
i accordingly. The details of
the scheme during this phase is described in Section 5.4.1.
(2) Target Update Phase (TUP): During the TUP, the upper-layer commu-
nication interface module at each EMC communicates with its neighboring EMCs
to execute the average consensus algorithm discussed in Section 5.3 and compute
the local demand target value θτi for frame τ . The length of this phase should
guarantee the convergence of the average consensus algorithm discussed in Section
5.3.
(3) Admission Control Phase (ACP): During the ACP, the EMC’s control
module makes the admission decision, i.e., decide which delay flexible appliances
can be turned on, given the local demand target value θτi . At the end of the
ACP, the lower-layer communication interface module sends a beacon signal to
broadcast the admission decision and synchronizes to the next frame. Details of
the admission control scheme are described in Section 5.4.2.
Note that in Figure 5.4 the length of the blocks do not show the relative length
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of each phase. The duration of each phase is a design parameter of the protocol
which can be adjusted according to the implementation scenario.
5.4.1 Load information update
To track fixed demand qˆτi and flexible demand requests q˜
τ
i , each EMC i maintains
the following sets of appliances in building i ∈ B:
- Active Appliance Set (Aτi ) contains already powered on appliances during the
frame τ in building i.
- Request Appliance Set (Rτi ) tracks appliances that are requested to power on
by the customer and their power-on request messages (PRQMs) are successfully
received by the EMC in building i during frame τ . If appliance j ∈ Ki \ (A
τ
i ∪R
τ
i )
is requested to power on, it sends a PRQM; upon receiving this message, the EMC
updates Rτi as R
τ
i = R
τ
i ∪ {j}.
- Release Appliance Set (X τi ) tracks appliances that wish to power off and their
power release messages (PRLMs) have been successfully received by the EMC in
building i during frame τ . Upon receiving the PRLM from an appliance j ∈ Aτi ,
the EMC updates X τi to X
τ
i = X
τ
i ∪ {j}.
Note that for a delay flexible appliance,1 whose PRQM (PRLM) is received by
the EMC, the appliance is not added to (removed from) Active Appliance Set (Aτi )
immediately; instead it is added to Rτi (X
τ
i ) and waits until the ACP phase to
be scheduled on/off by the EMC. Thus, Rτi and X
τ
i only contains delay flexible
1Note that some appliances have delay flexibilities in both turning-on and turning-off, e.g.,
electric vehicle battery and water heater. Some appliances, however, only provide delay flexibil-
ities regarding when they turn-on, e.g., clothes washer; in such cases, we can treat their turn-off
requests via the override option, discussed in Section 5.4.3
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appliances. When non-flexible appliances wish to turn on or off, they will be
treated as appliances with override option and will be added to (removed from)
Aτi immediately; this option will be discussed in Section 5.4.3.
The EMC updates these appliance sets according to the packets (PRQMs or
PRLMs) transmitted by appliances. Table 5.1 shows the essential fields in these
packets required for our approach. The RRI indicates whether this packet is a
PRQM or PRLM packet, and PCV is the power consumption value of the ap-
pliance. Other fields (ORI, MON, MSUS, DT) are related to the non-intrusive
operation of appliances which will be discussed in Section 5.4.3.
Table 5.1: Fields description in appliance TX packet
ID Appliance/EMC ID
RRI PRQM/PRLM indicator (0/1 binary)
ORI Override indicator (0/1 binary)
PCV Power consumption value in W
MON Minimum on time
MSUS Minimum suspension time
DT Delay tolerance
The EMC transmits an ACK packet to acknowledge successfully reception of
the PRQM/PRLM sent by an appliance. ACK is integrated in the general EMC
transmission packet. Table 5.2 shows the fields needed in the EMC transmis-
sion packet. For the EMC’s ACK transmission, the ACKID field is assigned the
appliance’s ID and thus acknowledges the success of packet reception from that
appliance. Other fields (BCI, OPD, RXD) are valid in the ACP phase which will
be discussed in Section 5.4.2.
Carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA), which is
widely used in wireless local area networks like IEEE 802.11 [65], is applied for
packet transmissions in our scheme. At the end of the LIUP, if an appliance’s
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Table 5.2: Fields description in EMC TX packet
ID Appliance/EMC ID
BCI Beacon packet indicator
ACKID ACK destination appliance ID, ACKID=0 for broadcast
OPD Appliances operation (on/off) decision vector, valid for the beacon
and broadcast (ACKID=0) packet
RXD Specify a RX duration in which appliances are allowed to transmit
request/release messages, valid for beacon packet
request is not received by the EMC due to collision, it will wait until the next
frame to send its request; however, if the duration of LIUP is long and the number
of requests is not large, the impact of collisions can be neglected.
At the end of the LIUP phase, with updated set Rτi and X
τ
i as well as A
τ
i for
frame τ , the fixed demand of building i can be computed as
qˆτi =
∑
j∈Aτi \X
τ
i
P τi,j , (5.8)
where P τi,j is the power consumption value for appliance j in building i during
frame τ .2 The requested demand from flexible appliances q˜τi can be computed as
q˜τi =
∑
j∈Rτi
P τi,j . (5.9)
5.4.2 Admission control mechanism
Given the flexible appliances request set Rτi and the local demand target value
θτi , the EMC makes admission decisions in the ACP phase, i.e., chooses which
2Note that in this discussion we assume P τi,j is a fixed constant over the frame τ . In reality,
the power consumption may vary with time. To this end, the length of the frame needs be
carefully designed so that our assumption gives accurate results. For those flexible appliances
that have fast variation of power consumption with time, we can also treat the change in power
consumption as an additional power-on/power-off request that is handled via the override option.
The override option will be discussed in Section 5.4.3.
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appliances in Rτi to turn on. The aim of the controller is to make the aggregated
load in building i approach θτi as close as possible, without being over θ
τ
i . We
employ a binary decision variable xj associated to each appliance j ∈ R
τ
i indicating
whether it can be turned on. The EMC’s optimization can be formulated as:
max
xj
∑
j∈Rτi
xj · Pi,j (5.10)
s.t. qˆτi +
∑
j∈Rτi
xj · Pi,j ≤ θ
τ
i (5.11)
xj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ R
τ
i , (5.12)
where xj = 1 indicates that appliance j is scheduled to turn on. (5.10) – (5.12) is
a classical 0 − 1 knapsack problem, which can be solved efficiently using various
existing approaches [45].
At the end of the ACP phase, the EMC broadcasts a packet containing the
admission results, i.e., it sets the OPD field in Table 5.2 accordingly. This packet
also serves as a beacon signal (set BCI=1 in Table 5.2) to specify the transmis-
sion/receiving duration (length of LIUP) for the next frame, by setting the RXD
field in Table 5.2, during which the power on/off request packets can be sent.
With the decision result {xj}, Admitted Appliance Set D
τ
i can be updated as
Dτi = {j|j ∈ R
τ
i , xj = 1 in (5.10)-(5.11)}.
The Active Appliance Set for the next frame τ + 1 is updated as
Aτ+1i = A
τ
i ∪ D
τ
i \ X
τ
i . (5.13)
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Note that the solution of (5.10) may result in a gap between qˆτi +
∑
j∈Rτi
xj ·Pi,j
and θτi , in which any appliance inR
τ
i can not be accommodated. This gap will most
likely exist at each building; the cumulative effect will produce a gap between the
actual scheduled aggregate demand and the desired aggregate demand. To alleviate
this gap, we employ a relaxed target θ˜τi = θ
τ
i +P
max
i , where P
max
i is the maximum
value of the appliances’ power consumptions within building i during frame τ .
With a probability of ζ, we assume the EMC uses this θ˜τi in the admission control
optimization. The parameter ζ is tuned according to the actual implementation.
This practical adjustment allows some buildings to use extra power beyond the
local demand target, but all buildings have this opportunity without bias due to the
probability ζ. Note that this scheme cannot remove the gap totally. Although large
values of ζ may decrease the gap, there may be a possibility that the aggregated
demand will exceed the desired demand; thus the trade-off in values of ζ should
be carefully considered in actual implementation.
5.4.3 Non-intrusive operation for appliances
Our approach exploits operational flexibility of appliances in terms of delaying
turning-on. In other words, the control scheme may change the original usage
profile of appliances. It is feasible for some kinds of non time-critical appliances
such as washing machine and clothes dryer, but appliances with critical time re-
quirement, such as TV, desktop, and emergency devices, are required to turn on
immediately once the customer wants to use them. In some cases, even for flexible
appliances, customers may not prefer to delay usage for a variety of reasons. The
underlying DR scheme should provide such override options for customers even
though overriding may affect the incentive rebates that customers receive. Besides
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the override option, non-intrusive operation may be needed, i.e., guaranteeing the
appliance’s task is completed before a deadline set by the customer. Furthermore,
this should be done while avoiding frequent appliance ON/OFF switches in the
scheduling. In the following, we will describe how non-intrusive operations are
integrated into our control scheme discussed above.
(1) Customer override option
Our control scheme provides customers with override option, e.g., to specify time
critical appliances or change request preferences. In such cases, the appliance
should be turned on/off as soon as the customer requests; meanwhile the appliance
sends a PRQM/PRLM packet with the ORI field set, as shown in Table 5.1, to
indicate the request is due to an override option.
If the PRQM packet with an override option from appliance j is received by
the EMC, the Active Appliance Set is updated as Aτi = A
τ
i ∪ {j}. However, since
during this frame τ , the demand of the building needs to be kept below the demand
target value computed at the end of the last frame, i.e., θτ−1i , this newly added
appliance may cause the actual demand to go above this target. In this scenario, a
curtailment is needed to ensure the demand target θτ−1i bound not being violated.
Define the Curtailable Appliance Set Cτi , where C
τ
i ⊆ A
τ
i , as the set of appliances
that can be curtailed in frame τ . A curtailment optimization is formulated by the
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EMC as:
max
yj
∑
j∈Cτi
(1− yj) · Pi,j (5.14)
s.t.
∑
k∈Aτi \C
τ
i
Pi,k +
∑
j∈Cτi
(1− yj) · Pi,j ≤ θ
τ−1
i (5.15)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ C
τ
i , (5.16)
where the binary variable yj = 1 indicates appliance j in C
τ
i is scheduled to be
curtailed. The curtailed appliances will be added to Rτi for future scheduling, i.e.,
Rτi = R
τ
i ∪ {j|j ∈ Cj, yj = 1 in (5.14)-(5.16)}.
If the PRLM packet with an override option from appliance j is received by the
EMC, the Active Appliance Set is updated as Aτi = A
τ
i \ {j}. In this scenario, the
gap between the actual demand
∑
j∈Aτi
Pi,j and the target value θ
τ−1
i will increase,
so that some additional appliances in Rτi may be accommodated and turned on.
Define the Admissible Appliance Set Sτi , S
τ
i ⊆ R
τ
i as the set of appliances
that can be admitted to power on at this moment. An admission optimization is
formulated for the EMC as:
max
zj
∑
j∈Sτi
zj · Pi,j (5.17)
s.t.
∑
k∈Aτi
Pi,k +
∑
j∈Sτi
zj · Pi,j ≤ θ
τ−1
i (5.18)
zj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ S
τ
i , (5.19)
where the binary variable zj = 1 indicates appliance j in S
τ
i is scheduled to turn
on and be added to Aτi , i.e., A
τ
i = A
τ
i ∪ {j|j ∈ Sj, zj = 1 in (5.17)-(5.19)}.
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For both cases, after the decision is made, the EMC (via lower-layer communi-
cation interface module) broadcasts an ACK packet in which the BCI and ACKID
fields, as shown in Table 5.2, are set to 0 indicating non-beacon and broadcast
packet, and the OPD field is set to the admission decision vector to inform all
appliances. Upon receiving this broadcast ACK, the corresponding appliances will
suspend power consumption (curtailment) or turn on.
Note that the override action may happen during TUP period, so the local
target demand θτi computation by the average consensus algorithm may not be
accurate in terms of actual demand status. However, this problem is trivial since
the duration of TUP can be designed to be very short, e.g., several seconds. In
such a case, the override operation of many appliances happen during this phase
with negligible probability; the override option during this short time can also be
disabled, which is feasible for customers.
(2) Preventing frequent ON/OFF switching
With the override option, some flexible appliances may be shut down temporarily
(suspended) or resumed. However, too frequent ON/OFF switching is harmful to
appliances. To accommodate this non-intrusive constraint, min-ON and min-OFF
parameters are specified for each appliance to indicate the minimum power-on
time after it is turned on and minimum off time after it is suspended. These two
parameters are passed to the EMC by the MON and MSUS fields, respectively, of
the PRQM packet shown in Table 5.1.
Accordingly, there are ON and OFF timers for each appliance in the EMC’s
control module to record the ON/OFF times. When the appliance is turned on,
either for the first time or when it resumes from a suspended state, the ON timer
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counts down with initial value min-ON. The appliance cannot be added to the
Curtailable Appliance Set, Cτi , until the timer reaches 0; this prevents the appli-
ance from being curtailed and suspended again. Similarly, when the appliance is
curtailed, the OFF timer counts down with initial value of min-OFF. The appli-
ance will not be added to the Admissible Appliance Set Sτi , until the timer reaches
0. This mechanism helps avoid frequent ON/OFF switching for appliances due to
curtailment and admission from the override operation.
(3) Operation deadline constraint
Although some flexible appliances allow delayed power-on or suspension, an oper-
ation deadline is usually needed to guarantee that the appliance’s task operation is
completed by the customer’s desired deadline. Our scheme integrates this require-
ment by specifying a DT field in the PRQM packet (shown in Table 5.1), which
represents the delay tolerance. This delay tolerance can be directly specified by the
customer, or if the customer indicates the deadline for the operation completion,
the DT can be computed as tci,k − tri,k − tdi,k, where tci,k, tri,k, and tdi,k are the
deadline point, the request time point, and the duration of operation, respectively.
After the EMC receives the PRQM packet containing the DT, a deadline timer
is set to the value of DT. When the appliance waits to get access or suspends,
the timer counts down. If the appliance is in power-on status, the timer pauses.
If the value of the timer is less than min-OFF parameter (MSUS), it can not be
scheduled to be suspended. If the timer reaches 0 before the task completion,
the appliance powers on as an override operation and continues to consume power
without interruption until the task is completed.
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5.5 Numerical Results
In the simulation, we consider a region with B = 400 buildings over which the
corresponding EMCs form a 20 × 20 mesh network. Each building in turn has
40 appliances to schedule, i.e., |Ki| = 40, 20 of which are delay flexible appli-
ances. Since typical residential appliances’ power consumption ranges from 50W
to 2000W [66], we assume power consumption values in our simulation to be uni-
formly distributed, i.e., Pi,k ∼ U(50W, 2000W), i ∈ B and k ∈ Ki. We assume the
power duration of appliances follows an exponential distribution with mean of µτi,k
(i.e., with rate of 1
µτ
i,k
). The request interval (that is, the duration from the time
at which appliance becomes idle to the time when the appliance is requested to
power on by the customer) is assumed to be exponentially distributed with mean
of ατi,k.
To make aggregate demand in the simulation be more practical, we employ
the actual real-time demand data of New York City from NYISO [67] to tune the
appliance power-on request interval parameter ατi,k. Specifically, we denote the base
value of this parameter by α0i,k, and the tuned value is computed as α
τ
i,k = γ
τ ·α0i,k,
where the ratio γτ is computed in terms of actual real-time demand data Qτ as
γτ =
(
1/L ·
∑L−1
τ=0 Q
τ
Qτ
)ω
, ω ≥ 1, (5.20)
where ω is the tuning parameter, and we choose ω = 1 in our simulation. From
(5.20) we can see the higher actual demand results in smaller power-on request
interval parameter ατi,k; thus the higher demand in the simulation due to more
frequent power-on requests. Figure 5.5 shows the aggregated demand of our test
system using the tuned parameters (Figure 5.5-b), and the actual average demand
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of N.Y.C used for tuning parameter ατi,k (Figure 5.5-a) is also shown for comparison.
We can see that the simulated demand follows the trend of the actual demand data.
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Figure 5.5: Aggregated demand profile for simulation
The step size of the average consensus algorithm in (5.5)–(5.6) can be computed
as ε = 2/[λ2(L) + λB(L)] = 0.2508, where the second smallest eigenvalue of graph
Laplacian matrix λ2(L) = 0.0246, which gives the convergence speed parameter
κ2 = 1 − ελ2(L) = 0.9938. Assuming the initial standard deviation of {qˆ
τ
i } and
{q˜τi }, i ∈ B to be ϕ0, and the converged deviation to be ϕc, the iteration time I
can be computed as
I =
ln(ϕc/ϕ0)
ln(κ2)
. (5.21)
Consider the worst case in which {qˆτi } and {q˜
τ
i } are polarized for all EMCs, i.e.,
half of the EMCs have the largest value of
∑40
j=1 P
max
i,j = |Ki| · P
max
i and half of
the EMCs have zero values, so ϕ0 = |Ki| ·P
max
i /2. We set the converged deviation
as ϕc = 0.1, so from (5.21) the upper bound of convergence iteration is computed
as I = 2083. Assuming the time of each iteration in the upper-layer network
(transmission and processing time) as 0.1ms, we can set the duration of TUP as
0.3s to guarantee convergence.
Figure 5.6 shows the scheduling results for one day under our proposed scheme.
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We can see the scheduled aggregated demand (blue curve) is closer to the desired
demand (black curve) than the original demand (red curve). With the proposed
scheme, the average deviation between the desired demand and actual demand
levels over the day decreases by 35.6% compared to that of the original demand.
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Figure 5.6: Scheduling demand using the proposed approach
5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, an innovative two-layer communication-based distributed direct
load control approach is proposed for future large-scale residential demand re-
sponse. The idea is to allocate the overall control task into each building by EMC
in a distributed way. We employ average consensus algorithms in the upper layer
network, which consists of connections between neighboring EMCs, to allocate tar-
get power consumption levels for each building. The EMC in each building then
schedules appliances operation according to the local power consumption target.
The protocol integrates these two-layer seamlessly and also enables non-intrusive
operation of appliances. Numerical results show notable improvement in the sys-
tem’s ability to match day-ahead demand predictions (i.e., supply) with day-of,
actual demand levels.
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Chapter 6
Market Effects of Deferrable
Loads as Demand Response
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on how demand response may influence the wholesale
electricity market. Favored by the FERC Order 745 [15] described in Section 1
stating compensation to DR resources in the wholesale electricity market, we are
interested in the market effects of demand side participation of DR aggregators.
Specifically, we employ the model proposed in [57], which quantizes load requests
from flexible load devices and bundles them into a set of discrete load categories,
each category being a queue of energy requests that has a specific load profile.
By dispatching appliances activating at a certain time from each queue, the DR
aggregator manages a load reservoir formed by the queues of requests. The ability
to queue and dispatch loads can be viewed as a special type of generation, from
the perspective of balancing supply and demand, with its own generation and
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cost. The “generation capacity” for the DR aggregator is largely dependent on
the schedulable resource, i.e., the number of flexible loads it controls, their arrival
rates, etc. On the other hand, the “generation cost” is the delay inconvenience cost
to customers due to queued loads.
In order to analyze market effects of the DR participation in the wholesale
energy market as a DR aggregator, in this chapter we adopt the Cournot game
model, which is widely used to describe the behavior of traditional generators in the
electricity market [68–75]. In contrast to market analysis using the supply function
equilibrium (SFE) model [76–78], the Cournot model is generally computationally
tractable and much easier to analyze. More detailed reviews of game-theoretic
models for the wholesale electricity market can be found in our work [79]. In
the Cournot model, each strategic generator chooses its generation level in order
to compete in the market and maximize its own profits. The price of electricity
is determined by the ISO using these offered generation quantities and a given
demand function. A major contribution of our work is to demonstrate how the
Cournot game model is modified when a large DR aggregator participates in the
game by not just reducing load but queuing and shifting loads in time. Given that
load reduction can be compensated as generation, the DR aggregator can now
compete with traditional generators in a Cournot-Nash manner to make a profit
in the wholesale electricity market.
There are some existing studies that examine inclusion of DR entities in whole-
sale electricity markets. [80] incorporated the hourly demand response into security-
constrained unit commitment (SCUC) for economic and security purposes, where
the responsive loads are modeled with their inter-temporal characteristics. [81] pre-
sented a stochastic model to schedule reserves as an ancillary service provided by
DR in the wholesale electricity market. The proposed stochastic model is formu-
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lated as a two-stage stochastic mixed-integer programming (SMIP) problem. [82]
proposed a security-constrained forward market clearing algorithm within which
the inherent characteristics of demand flexibility are acknowledged when the pro-
vision of reserve from the demand side is considered. [83] applied a Cournot game
model to examine the specific effect of pumped hydro storage in Germany. The
integration of EVs as specific DR resources into wholesale electricity markets is
discussed in [84], [85]. Some game-theoretic methods applied to smart grid can be
found in [86] and [87].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes
the computationally efficient model of deferrable load. Section 6.3 describes the
Cournot game model in which DR aggregators participate in the wholesale market
from the supply side. Section 6.4 analyzes the equilibrium of the DR-participating
Cournot game. Section 6.5 presents numerical results and we conclude our discus-
sion in Section 6.6.
6.2 Modeling the Deferrable Load
In [57], a computationally efficient model is proposed to account for the underlying
components that constitute the aggregate deferrable load. This model can mainly
be used to account for non-interruptible long duration loads with predictable job
lengths. Examples include electric vehicles, washing machines, tumble dryers, etc.
In the following part, we show how this model for aggregate deferrable load is
integrated in the wholesale dispatch optimization.
We assume that electric demand due to any deferrable appliance can be ap-
proximated by one of q = 1, . . . , Q discrete time pulses gq(.). We associate a service
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queue with each of these pulses. Every appliance that arrives in the system can be
categorized as a deferrable load. It is assigned to one of these queues and needs to
wait in order to be authorized to turn on. Denote the total number of arrivals and
departures (appliance activations) in the q-th queue, from the origin of time until
epoch ℓ, by aq(ℓ) and dq(ℓ) respectively. Note that this means that the number of
appliance arrivals and activations at epoch ℓ is respectively given by aq(ℓ)−aq(ℓ−1)
and dq(ℓ) − dq(ℓ − 1). Now, we can write the aggregate deferrable load L
S(ℓ) at
time ℓ as,
LS(ℓ) =
Q∑
q=1
ℓ∑
k=1
[dq(k)− dq(k − 1)]gq(ℓ− k). (6.1)
Details of this formulation can be found in [57]. In addition, we need to specify
the constraints for scheduling the deferrable load as follows.
(1) Causality and deadline constraints: From (6.1) we can see that deter-
mining the optimal values of LS(ℓ) is equivalent to finding the optimal values of the
Q queue departure processes dq(ℓ). However, several constraints for this departure
process dq(ℓ) need to be specified.
First, we look at simple causality constraints. An appliance cannot be turned
on before it requests energy. Also, by definition, the values of dq(ℓ) should be
non-decreasing. Thus,
0 ≤ dq(ℓ− 1) ≤ dq(ℓ) ≤ aq(ℓ), ∀ℓ, q. (6.2)
Additional constraints can be added to ensure that an acceptable quality of
service (QoS) is delivered to the deferrable loads. For example, we can ensure that
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all the deferrable loads participating in the wholesale market are served by the last
hour of the day t = H. If we denote by τq the length of the pulse gq(.) associated
to the q-th queue, this would mean that:
dq(H − ℓ) = aq(H − ℓ), ∀q, ℓ < τq. (6.3)
However, ensuring that all the loads are served by the end of the day may not
result in an acceptable level of QoS and is too optimistic in terms of modeling the
flexibility of customers. To penalize the operator for overly delaying the service to
the appliances waiting in queues, we propose one of the following options depending
on complexity and reliability preferences:
(2) Per queue maximum delay constraints: Denote the maximum delay that
appliances in the q-th queue can tolerate by γq. Then, maximum delay constraints
for the q-th queue are:
dq(ℓ) > aq(ℓ− γq), ∀q, ℓ. (6.4)
(3) Addition of an average delay cost: A less computationally intensive
option is to define a new cost term that can be added to the dispatch optimization
in order to avoid dispatches with unacceptable levels of delay. Here, the operator
will define a cost term proportional to the average delay experienced by the entire
population. The number of appliances waiting in the q-th queue at time ℓ without
receiving service is given by aq(ℓ)− dq(ℓ). Thus, if we weigh queues differently, the
delay cost increment at time ℓ is given by:
DCI(ℓ) =
Q∑
q=1
υq(ℓ) [aq(ℓ)− dq(ℓ)] . (6.5)
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6.3 Cournot Game of Wholesale Market with DR
Aggregator Participation
We consider an electric network with N = |N | nodes, where N denotes the set of
all nodes in the network. LetN g ⊂ N denote nodes at which traditional generators
are located. DR aggregators are located at a set of nodes, which we denote by NG.
In addition, we assume N g
⋂
NG = ∅.
We model the day-ahead energy market as Cournot game, which has been well
established in a series of papers [70], [74], [73] and [75] by Oren et al. In this model,
suppliers determine generation quantities to compete in a Nash-Cournot manner
over a time horizon H. The suppliers here include both traditional generators
and DR aggregators. Each traditional generator i ∈ N g decides its generation
quantities as ζgi (ℓ) for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , H, while the scheduling capability enables DR
aggregator to make a load modification decision ζdlj (ℓ), for j ∈ N
dl, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , H.
Both traditional generators and the DR aggregator aim to maximize their profit,
given as the revenue collected minus the generation cost.
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Figure 6.1: Participation of DR aggregators in the wholesale market
The ISO in this model determines how to dispatch electricity within the network
so as to maximize total social surplus subject to transmission constraints. Specif-
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ically, it obtains the optimal power import value ri(ℓ) at each node. Since the
generator and the ISO take into consideration each other’s actions, their decisions
are treated as simultaneous moves in the model. The structure of the wholesale
market with inclusion of DR aggregators is shown in Figure 6.1.
In Cournot model, the demand behavior at node i is described by the inverse
demand function (IDF) [74] , [70], and is given as p = Pi(w), where p is the
price of electricity and w is the demand. This function describes how the demand
responds to the price, and in general it is a decreasing function indicating that
as price increases, customers will decrease their demand. Given IDF Pi(·) at each
node i, the demand as well as the locational price for each node can be obtained by
jointly solving the optimization problem of generators, DR aggregators and ISO
(i.e., the equilibrium point). We will formulate optimization problems for each
entity in next section.
For ease of analysis, we employ the linear demand function, which is widely
used in the Cournot game model in Oren’s work [70], [74], [73] and [75], as
pj = Pj(wj) = cj − bj · wj, j ∈ N (6.6)
where wj is the demand at node j. The slope bj indicates the demand responsive-
ness, i.e., how the price affects the quantity demanded, while cj indicates factors
other than price that affect demand. The parameter bj could be time-varying, as
bj(ℓ) for hour ℓ.
6.3.1 Optimization for generators
Traditional generators aim to maximize their profit by simultaneously choosing
generation quantities ζgi (ℓ), i ∈ N
g, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , H. Since there is no temporal
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correlation of each hour’s generation,1 the profit maximization for the whole day is
just to maximize the profit for each hour independently. For notational simplicity,
we omit the hour index ℓ here. The profit maximization problem for a generator
located at node i can be formulated as:
max
ζgi :i∈N
g
Pi(ri + ζ
g
i )ζ
g
i − Ci(ζ
g
i ) (6.7)
s.t. ζmini ≤ ζ
g
i ≤ ζ
max
i , i ∈ N
g (6.8)
where Pi(ri + ζ
g
i ) is the price with demand of ri + ζ
g
i . Note that ri is the power
import value at node i determined by ISO. When ri > 0, power is delivered to this
node; when ri is negative, node i transmits power into the electricity network. The
first term in the objective function (6.7) represents the revenue of generating ζgi of
power, while the second term refers to the generation cost. The cost of generation
is usually modeled to be convex, e.g., quadratic or piece-wise linear function. The
ζmini and ζ
max
i in the constraint indicate the minimum generation when ON and
capacity limit of the generator located at node i. The generators here are assumed
to have been scheduled ON in the unit commitment (UC) problem.
6.3.2 Optimization for DR aggregator
With schedulability from deferrable loads, the DR aggregator can make load re-
ductions, which is equivalent to generation in terms of balancing power on the
electricity market. In order to formulate the optimization problem for the DR
aggregator, how the ‘generation’ value ζdl(ℓ) are mapped in terms of deferrable
load parameters (e.g., the departure process and the q-th queue’s load profile) as
well as constraints of these parameters need to be modeled mathematically. The
1We omit the ramp constraint for simplicity.
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load modification ζdl(ℓ) from deferrable load managed by a DR aggregator can be
computed as
ζdl(ℓ) = L¯S(ℓ)− LS(ℓ) =
Q∑
q=1
ℓ∑
k=1
[λq(k)− dq(k) + dq(k − 1)]gq(ℓ− k), (6.9)
where L¯S(ℓ) =
∑Q
q=1
∑ℓ
k=1 λq(k)g(ℓ − k) is the original demand from these de-
ferrable loads, and λq(k) = [aq(k) − aq(k − 1)] is the arrival rate for time k. As
discussed in Section 6.2, the DCI can be viewed as cost that customers experience
due to a ‘generation’ of ζdl(ℓ).
By choosing the departure processes {dq,j(ℓ)}, the DR aggregator aims to max-
imize its profit over the time horizon H, which is the money it gets for load modifi-
cation ζdlj , minus the inconvenience cost DCI. For notational simplicity, we omit the
DR aggregator index subscript of j, and the optimization for the DR aggregator
is:
max
{dq(ℓ)}
H∑
ℓ=1
[
Pℓ
(
r(ℓ) + ζdl(ℓ)
)
ζdl(ℓ)
]
−DCI (6.10)
s.t. dq(H − ℓ) = aq(H − ℓ), ∀q, ℓ < τq (6.11)
dq(ℓ) ≤ aq(ℓ) =
ℓ∑
s=1
λq(s), ∀q, ℓ (6.12)
dq(ℓ− 1) ≤ dq(ℓ), ∀q, ℓ (6.13)
dq(ℓ) ≥ aq(ℓ− γq), ∀q, ℓ (6.14)
dq(ℓ) ∈ Z+ ∪ {0}, ∀q, ℓ (6.15)
where ζdl(ℓ) and DCI are expressed as in (6.9) and (6.5), respectively. The con-
straints (6.11)-(6.15) are corresponding to (6.2), (6.3) and (6.4) in Section 6.2.
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6.3.3 Optimization for the ISO
The ISO aims to maximize the social welfare of the entire system, which is given by
the total consumer willingness-to-pay (the aggregated area under the nodal inverse
demand curves) minus the total generation cost. (See [74], [88] for details.) The
social welfare of node i can be written as:
∑
i∈N
(∫ ri(ℓ)+ζi(ℓ)
0
Pi(τi)dτi − Ci(ζi(ℓ))
)
,
where ζi(ℓ) is the ℓ-th hour’s generation value (ζ
g
i (ℓ) if i ∈ N
g, or ζdli (ℓ) if ∈ N
dl)
at node i. Ci(·) is the corresponding generation cost function (delay inconvenience
cost) for generators (DR aggregator). The {ri(ℓ)}i∈N is the power import value for
each node, which is decided by the ISO. We next specify the constraints for ISO
optimization.
(1) Power balance constraint: Since ri(ℓ), i ∈ N is the power import value
at node i, the demand at node i is actually ζgi (ℓ) + ri(ℓ), if there is a traditional
generator, and ζdli (ℓ) + ri(ℓ), if a DR aggregator is located at node i. Since the
total load and total generation must be balanced at all moments, {ri(ℓ)} should
satisfy the energy balancing constraint:
∑
i∈N ri(ℓ) = 0. ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , H
(2) Demand constraint: For all nodes, the demand value should not be neg-
ative, i.e., ζi + ri ≥ 0, i ∈ N . For the DR aggregator node, although it has an
equivalent ‘generation’ ζdl(ℓ), it is actually a demand node, i.e., it consumes power
from the network. So the power import at a DR aggregator node should be a
non-negative value, i.e., ri(ℓ) ≥ 0, i ∈ N
dl.
(3) Transmission constraint: {ri(ℓ)} must satisfy the network line power con-
straint, i.e., the resulting power flows should not exceed the thermal limits of the
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corresponding transmission line in both directions. We use Power Transfer Distri-
bution Factor (PTDF) to describe the linear approximation of the relation between
power flow and power injection. Given the PTDF of node i in relation to branch
m as Smi, if the injection change at node i is ∆ri, the power flow change in the
branch m would be ∆Pm =
∑N
i=1 Smi∆ri. Let M denote the set of all the trans-
mission lines in the system and Km denote the limit of transmission line m. The
transmission constraints in terms of {ri} is: −Km ≤
∑
i∈N Smiri ≤ Km, m ∈M.
Note that the ζi(ℓ) values, decided by generators/DR aggregator, are known
to the ISO, so the cost function part can be removed from the objective function.
Hence, the optimization for ISO for hour ℓ can be formulated as
max
{ri}
∑
i∈N
∫ ri(ℓ)+ζi(ℓ)
0
Pi,ℓ(τi)dτi (6.16)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
ri(ℓ) = 0 (6.17)
ri(ℓ) + ζi(ℓ) ≥ 0, i ∈ N (6.18)
ri(ℓ) ≥ 0, i ∈ N
dl (6.19)
−Km ≤
∑
i∈N
Smiri(ℓ) ≤ Km, m ∈M, (6.20)
6.4 Equilibrium Analysis
The equilibrium conditions are the result of jointly solving the optimization prob-
lems for the ISO, generators and DR aggregators. It is easy to see that the opti-
mization for each entity is convex so the optimal (KKT) conditions can be derived.
In the following parts, we let bold font X denote matrix, ~X denote vector, (X)i,j
denote i, j entry of matrix X, ~XT(XT) denote transpose of vector ~X (matrix X),
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and diag{~x} denote the diagonal matrix with diagonal entries as vector ~x.
6.4.1 Optimality conditions for DR aggregator
Let vector ~D = [~d1, ~d2, . . . , ~dQ]
T denote decision variables of the DR aggregator,
where each element is a row vector ~dq = [dq(1), dq(2), . . . , dq(H)]. To express
the optimization in a general matrix form, we denote arrival rate vector by ~Λ =
[~λ1, ~λ2, . . . , ~λQ]
T, where ~λq = [λq(1), λq(2), . . . , λq(H)]; load profile matrix by G =
[ ~G(1), ~G(2), . . . , ~G(H)]T, where each row is a transpose of a vector ~G(ℓ) with length
H · Q given as: ~G(ℓ) = [~g1(ℓ), ~g2(ℓ), . . . , ~gQ(ℓ)]
T, with ~gq(ℓ) = [gq(ℓ − 1), gq(ℓ −
2), . . . , gq(ℓ−H)], and we define gq(ℓ− k) = 0 if ℓ− k < 0.
Define matrix U as
U = IQ ⊗ U˜, (U˜)i,j =


−1, i = j
1, i− 1 = j
0, o.w.
, i, j ∈ [1, H]
where IQ is identity matrix of size Q, and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. So
ζdl(ℓ) can be expressed in matrix form as
ζdl(ℓ) = ~G(ℓ)T(~Λ +U ~D).
The arrival process vector of appliances ( ~A) can be expressed in terms of arrival
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rate vector ~Λ as ~A = L~Λ, where L is defined as
L = IQ ⊗ L˜, (L˜)i,j =


1, i ≥ j
0, o.w.
, i, j ∈ [1, H]
The delay inconvenience cost (DCI) in (6.5) can also be expressed in matrix
form as
DCI = ~υT(L~Λ− ~D),
where ~υ = [~υD1 , ~υ
D
2 , . . . , ~υ
D
Q ]
T is vector of delay cost per hour, such that ~υDq =
[υDq (1), υ
D
q (2), . . . , υ
D
q (H)]. Thus, ~υ has a length of H ·Q. The inequality constraint
(6.12) and (6.13) can be expressed as
~D − L~Λ ≤ ~0, (6.21)
U ~D ≤ ~0, (6.22)
and the inequality constraint (6.14) can be expressed as
~D ≥ NL~Λ, (6.23)
where N is defined as
N=


N˜1 0 · · · 0
0 N˜2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · N˜Q


, (N˜q)i,j=


1, ∀i ∈ [1, H], j= i−τq > 0,
0, o.w.
So we can see N is a square matrix with size of H ·Q.
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The equality constraint (6.11) can be expressed as
M ~D =ML~Λ, (6.24)
where the matrix M is defined as
M=


M˜1 0 · · · 0
0 M˜2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · M˜Q


, (M˜q)i,j=


1, ∀i ∈ [1, γq], j=H−i+1
0, o.w.
So we can see M has rows of
∑Q
q=1 γq elements and columns of H ·Q elements.
With linear IDF defined in (6.6), the objective function of DR aggregator can
be written as
∑H
ℓ=1
[
c(ℓ)ζdl(ℓ)− b(ℓ)r(ℓ)ζdl(ℓ)− b(ℓ)(ζdl(ℓ))2
]
−DCI. Note that we
omit the subscript j for simplicity. The matrix form of the objective function can
then be written as
z + ~Y T ~D + ~DTX ~D. (6.25)
where constant z, vector ~Y , and matrix X are
z = ~cTG~Λ− ~rTBG~Λ− ~vTL~Λ− ~ΛTGTBG~Λ,
~Y T = (~cT −~bTR− 2~ΛTGTB)GU+ ~vT,
X = −UTGTBGU,
such that ~c = [c(1), c(2), . . . , c(H)]T, ~b = [b(1), b(2), . . . , b(H)]T with B = diag{~b}
and ~r = [r(1), r(2), . . . , r(H)]T. Since z is a constant, it can be removed from the
objective function.
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Note that since dq(ℓ) must take non-negative integer values, this optimization is
an integer programming problem, so the optimality conditions can not be derived
directly. Here we relax dq(ℓ) to be a continuous variable, and we show that the
floor value of the solution for the relaxed problem is feasible, as shown in Lemma
6.4.1.
Lemma 6.4.1. If the optimal solution to the relaxation problem, in which dq(ℓ) is
relaxed as a continuous non-negative value, is d∗q(ℓ), then the floor of this value,
i.e., ⌊d∗q(ℓ)⌋ is always feasible.
Proof. Let ~D∗ denote the vector of optimal solutions of departure process {d∗q(ℓ)}
to the relaxation problem. Since ⌊x⌋ ≤ x, we get
⌊ ~D∗⌋ ≤ ~D∗ ≤ L~Λ.
So the solution ⌊ ~D∗⌋ satisfies constraint (6.21). Also since d∗q(ℓ − 1) ≤ d
∗
q(ℓ), the
floor of d∗q(ℓ) satisfies ⌊d
∗
q(ℓ − 1)⌋ ≤ ⌊d
∗
q(ℓ)⌋. Thus, the constraint (6.22) is also
satisfied. For inequality constraint (6.23), since NL~Λ is an integer vector, we get
⌊ ~D∗⌋ ≥ NL~Λ.
For the equality constraints, the original solutions {d∗q(H − ℓ)}, ℓ < τq, are
integer values, so ⌊d∗q(H−ℓ)⌋ = d
∗
q(H−ℓ). This means that ⌊ ~D
∗⌋ satisfies constraint
(6.24).
So the floor solution ⌊ ~D∗⌋ is feasible.
Using Lemma 6.4.1, we can get the optimality conditions of the relaxed problem
and floor it to get the (sub-optimal) final solution. The relaxed problem can be
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written as a standard quadratic program as
min
~D
f( ~D) = −~Y T ~D − ~DTX ~D (6.26)
s.t. M ~D −ML~Λ = ~0 (~Θ1) (6.27)
U ~D ≤ ~0 (~Θ2) (6.28)
− ~D +NL~Λ ≤ ~0 (~Θ3) (6.29)
~D − L~Λ ≤ ~0, (~Θ4) (6.30)
where ~Θ1–~Θ4 are the corresponding Lagrangian multiplier vectors. The KKT con-
ditions can be written accordingly:
−~Y − 2X ~D +MT ~Θ1 +U
T ~Θ2−~Θ3+~Θ4=0 (6.31)
M ~D −ML~Λ = ~0 (6.32)
U ~D ≤ ~0 (6.33)
− ~D +NL~Λ ≤ ~0 (6.34)
~D − L~Λ ≤ ~0 (6.35)
~Θ2, ~Θ3, ~Θ4 ≥ ~0 (6.36)
diag{~Θ2}U ~D = ~0 (6.37)
diag{~Θ3}( ~D −NL~Λ) = ~0 (6.38)
diag{~Θ4}( ~D − L~Λ) = ~0 (6.39)
6.4.2 Optimality conditions for the ISO and generators
Since the optimization variables of ISO and generators are not time correlated,
they can be conducted independently for each hour. For ease of notational simpli-
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fication, we omit the time index ℓ. For the ISO, the power import for each node
can be expressed as a vector ~R = [r1, r2, . . . , rN ]
T. Let ~bn = [b1, b2, . . . , bN ]
T and
~cn = [c1, c2, . . . , cN ]
T denote the slope and intercept vector of linear IDF in (6.6)
for all nodes, respectively, and Bn = diag{~bn}. Let vector ~ζ = [ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζN ]
T
represent ζi for all nodes, where ζi can be represented as follows.
ζi =


ζgi , if i ∈ N
g,
ζdli , if i ∈ N
dl,
0, otherwise.
(6.40)
The optimization (6.16)-(6.20) can be written in matrix forms as
min
~R
(~ζTBn − ~c
T
n )~R +
1
2
~RTBn ~R (6.41)
s.t. ~1T ~R = 0 (Φ1) (6.42)
− ~R− ~ζ ≤ ~0 (~Φ2) (6.43)
− Idl ~R ≤ ~0 (~Φ3) (6.44)
− S~R− ~K ≤ ~0 (~Φ4) (6.45)
S~R− ~K ≤ ~0 (~Φ5) (6.46)
where ~1 = [1, 1, . . . , 1]T with length of N , and diagonal matrix Idl =diag{~1N dl},
with ~1N dl denoting the unit vector representing the DR aggregator nodes. S is the
PTDF matrix with size of M ×N . Let Φ1, ~Φ2-~Φ5 denote the Lagrange multiplier
(vectors) of equality and inequality constraints, and the KKT conditions can be
written accordingly.
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(~cn −Bn~ζ)−Bn ~R + Φ1~1−~Φ2−IG~Φ3−S
T~Φ4+S
T~Φ5=~0 (6.47)
~1T ~R = 0 (6.48)
−~R− ~ζ ≤ ~0 (6.49)
−Idl ~R ≤ ~0 (6.50)
−S~R− ~K ≤ ~0 (6.51)
S~R− ~K ≤ ~0 (6.52)
~Φ2, ~Φ3, ~Φ4, ~Φ5 ≥ ~0 (6.53)
diag{~Φ2}(~R + ~ζ) = ~0 (6.54)
diag{~Φ3}I
dl ~R = ~0 (6.55)
diag{~Φ4}(S~R + ~K) = ~0 (6.56)
diag{~Φ5}(S~R− ~K) = ~0 (6.57)
For the generator at node i, let ξ−i and ξ
+
i denote the Lagrange multiplier of
inequality constraints for lower and upper bound of ζgi , respectively. The KKT
conditions can be formulated accordingly.
−ci + biri + 2biζ
g
i + C
′
i(ζ
g
i )− ξ
−
i + ξ
+
i = 0 (6.58)
ξ−i ≥ 0, ξ
+
i ≥ 0 (6.59)
ζmini ≤ ζ
g
i ≤ ζ
max
i (6.60)
ξ−i · (ζ
min
i − ζ
g
i ) = 0 (6.61)
ξ+i · (ζ
g
i − ζ
max
i ) = 0, (6.62)
where C ′i(ζ
g
i ) is the first derivative of the generator cost function.
124
6.4.3 Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
The equilibrium point can be solved by jointly solving the equilibrium conditions
for DR aggregators, generators, and the ISO. With linear inverse demand function,
and cost function of generators being convex quadratic or piece-wise linear, which
is a common assumption, we have Lemma 6.4.2 about the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium.
Lemma 6.4.2. If we assume a convex cost function, e.g., quadratic or piece-wise
linear, for generators, and linear inverse demand function, the equilibrium point
of the Cournot game with participating DR aggregators exists and is unique.
Proof. a) For the DR aggregator’s optimization in (6.26), since −X = UTGTBGU
is a positive definite matrix (B is positive definite diagonal matrix), the objective
is a convex function. So the utility function that the DR aggregator wants to
maximize is concave. b) For the ISO’s optimization, from (6.16) we can see the
objective is also a convex function, implying the utility function is concave. c) For
generators’ optimization in (6.7), if the cost function Ci(ζ
g
i ) is a convex (quadratic
or piece-wise linear as general forms), the utility function is a concave function. d)
The constraints for these optimizations are linear. In this case, the existence of an
equilibrium directly results from Theorem 1 in [89]. Moreover, the equilibrium is
unique due to Theorem 2 and 3 in [89].
With Lemma 6.4.2, we can get the market equilibrium by jointly solving the
optimizations of the DR aggregator, generators, and the ISO.
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6.5 Numerical Results
We apply the proposed Cournot model to the IEEE 24-bus test network shown
in Figure 6.2, which is composed of 24 nodes and 38 lines. The time horizon
is set as H = 24 hours. We assume the generators’ cost function as quadratic,
where the coefficients of cost functions, lower and upper bounds of generation,
as well as the transmission line parameters for this 24-bus network can be found
in case file ‘case24 ieee rts.m’ in MATPOWER [90]. The function ‘makePTDF’
in MATPOWER can be used to compute the PTDF parameters for the system.
We choose nodes 20, 19, 17, and 6 as candidates for DR aggregators shown in
Figure 6.2. The DR aggregator is responsible for providing battery recharging
services to a population of 40k plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), where a
realistic arrival, charge request, and maximum delay model developed in [91] is
employed in the simulation. We assume all nodes have the same IDF intercept
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Figure 6.2: IEEE 24-bus test network with DR aggregators
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c = $70, which keeps unchanged over time ℓ. The IDF slope bi at each node
employs the values in [73]. The CPLEX 12.4 [39] optimization solver is used to
solve the quadratic programming problem for DR aggregators, generators, and the
ISO. MATLAB 2009a is used to formulate the problem and link the CPLEX solver.
The simulation environment is of Intel Duo Core 2.0GHz with 2GB memory. The
execution time for solving the DR aggregator’s optimization in (6.26) with H = 24
hours and the number of queues Q = 5 is 0.016s.
In order to make this Cournot game energy market similar to the real market,
we need to adjust the slope of each hour in a day such that the hours with a higher
actual price have a lower slope; thus gives a higher price in Cournot model. We
use day-ahead prices of New York City from NYISO [36] for these adjustments,
i.e., given day-ahead LMP as κ(ℓ) for hour ℓ, the adjusted coefficient is computed
as
β(ℓ) =
(1/24)
∑24
k=1 κ(k)
κ(ℓ)
,
and adjusted time-variant slope at bus i can be computed as bi(ℓ) = β(ℓ) · bi.
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Figure 6.3: Cournot game price validation at node 20 (No DR aggregator)
Figure 6.3 plots the market prices of electricity at node 20 for the 24 hours
obtained from the Cournot model, compared with the actual day-ahead price of
N.Y.C.; in this case, we do not include the DR aggregator’s participation. We can
see the price profile has the same trend as the actual case, verifying our Cournot
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game model is reasonable. In the Cournot model, since each node has an inverse
demand function, this demand responsiveness serves as a feedback scheme which
prevents the price from reaching a very high value. Note that we use a 24-hour
planning horizon from 6:00AM to 5:59AM the next day. With this shifting, there is
enough off-peak time for the delayed load coming from the peak hours of yesterday
to spread, thus avoiding a load bump in the last hours. This time-shift actually
does not affect the ISO’s day-ahead optimization since we ignore the generation
ramp in our model and there is no time correlation in the optimization.
Figure 6.4 provides the electricity price profile for the day at DR aggregator
node (Bus 20) and regular node (Bus 5), using the Cournot model with presence
and absence of the DR aggregator. We can see during the original peak price hour
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(5:00 PM–8:00 PM), the price when DR aggregator participates in the market
decreases compared to the case when there is no DR aggregator for both nodes.
During peak times, the DR aggregator will benefit more from load reduction due
to higher prices. The load reduction will allow other generators to lower their gen-
eration, so avoiding the high cost generation and alleviating the congestion make
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electricity prices decrease. The price reduction at the DR aggregator node (Bus
20) is more obvious than that at regular nodes. We also notice that during off-peak
price hour (12:00 AM – 6:00 AM), the price increases since the DR aggregator shifts
deferrable loads during this period, which can be seen in the power consumption
profile of aggregated PHEVs load in Figure 6.4(c).
Figure 6.5(a) shows as more load nodes are equipped with DR aggregators,
prices decrease further during peak hours. Figure 6.5(b) shows as more DR ag-
gregators are added, the overall profit of DR aggregators increases, i.e., all DR
aggregators make profit for participation in the market, which is the customers’
saving to enroll in this program.
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Figure 6.5: Price reduction and profit of DR aggregator
6.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we apply a Cournot game model to analyze market effects of DR
aggregators’ participation in the wholesale market. We show how the deferrable
load as a market asset is managed by the DR aggregator to compete with other
generators in a Cournot-Nash manner. We formulate optimization problems for
DR aggregators, generators and the ISO, and analyze the market equilibrium. Nu-
merical results show that with DR participation, the market price will be lowered
and thus save money for customers.
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